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Chapter 5
Social Security Moneys Worth
John Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell, and
Stephen P Zeldes
"Money's worth" measures playa prominent role in the U.S. social security
reform debate. For example, the Social Security Advisory Council (1997)
recently scored three reform plans according to the internal rate of return,
the discounted benefit-to-ta.x ratio, and the net present value, and it con-
cluded that all three plans would substantially improve social security's pel'-
formance on money's worth criteria. In the popular press, pundits and
politicians compare rates of return anticipated under the current social
security system with historical average returns on U.S. capital markets. After
realizing how much higher market returns have been than those projected
on social security, some observers conclude that shifting from our current
underfunded social security system to an individual-account, defined con-
tribution program would lead to higher returns for all. Thus presidential
candidate Stephen Forbes (1996) declared that "the average worker retir-
ing today receives a lifetime return ofonly about 2.2 percent on the taxes he
has paid into the system. Contrast this with the historic 9-10 percent annual
returns from stock market investments.... The advantages of an IRA-type
approach are overpowering.'"
This chapter offers a critical assessment of money's worth measures as
they are used in the context of social security reform. These measures have
been used for two distinct purposes by policy analysts: to compare how
different groups fare relative to each other under a given social security
system,2 and to compare how a given group fares under alternative systems.
In this chapter we concentrate on money's worth measures as used in the
second context - for instance, in comparing cohorts' returns under the cur-
rent, pay-as-you-go, mostly unfunded system with returns under other sys-
tems that require more or less funding, different benefit structures, or some
other format altogether. In so doing, we are interested in assessing how
alternative social security systems would affect different cohorts over time.
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The study begins with a stylized model of multiple generations. We as-
sume a constant annual real interest rate of 2.3 percent and a constant
growth rate of 1.2 percent, and simulate the actual economy to a surprising
degree of accuracy. We show that declining social security returns are the
inevitable result of having instituted an unfunded (pay-as-you-go) retire-
ment system that delivered benefits to people already old at the time the
system started. We prove that in an ongoing social security system, with or
without a trust fund, the net present value of transfers to all generations
must sum to zero. If early participants received substantial positive transfers
from the system, then later generations must receive negative transfers.
Later generations must earn low rates of ,·eturn on their social security
contributions because early cohorts received high returns. Part of social
security taxes should thus be seen as payments on past debt incurred to
transfer money to retirees soon after system startup, not as investments in
assets producing future income.
An importan t element ofsystem reform concerns the fate of the accrued
benefits for past contributions. There are several ways of computing this
liability. Goss (forthcoming) describes a method similar to what we will call
the straight-line method that at shut-{jown would entitle someone who
worked three-quarters of his or her worklife to three-quarters of the retire-
ment benefit. We propose instead a constant-benefit calculation, one that
allocates to each dollar of contributions the same present value in benefits
(discounted to the contribution date). The former method gives accrued
benefits in our stylized economy of $9.1 trillion discounted to 1997; the
latter gives $9.9 trillion. If the social security system were ever shut down,
this $800 billion difference might be an important source of controversy.
A popular argument suggests that if social security were privatized, every-
one could earn higher returns. We show that this is false. That is, suppose
the old unfunded system were shut down and workers' new payrOll taxes
were invested in capital markets. Suppose that explicit debt were issued to
replace accrued benefits, and the path ofthis explicit debt were kept identi-
cal to what the path of the present value of accrued benefits would have
been in an ongoing system. Then after-tax returns on privatized accounts
would be identical to the low returns received under the old system. For
example, in our stylized economy, workers receive only 71 cents in benefits
in present value terms for each dollar of contributions to the current sys-
tem. In a privatized system, each dollar of contribution would have to be
taxed 29 cents to make payments on the bonds replacing accrued benefit
obligations, yielding the same 71 cents of benefits.
Next we turn to an analysis of how money's worth measures are derived in
practice, drawing on and comparing the pioneering research of Leimer
(1994), Goss (forthcoming), and Advisory Council (1997). Their results
reveal that the U.S. social security system heavily subsidized more than 50
birth cohorts alive when the system was implemented. When these groups
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pass on, they will have received a net subsidy of around $9.7 trillion (in
$1997 present value terms). The current unfunded liability, or the preseHl
value of accrued benefits minus the current trust fund, is $8.9 trillion calcu-
lated according to a method close to the straight-line method. This is close
to the $9.1 trillion obtained in our stylized economy, and it suggesLs that the
constant-benefit method would have produced something like $9.7 trillion
for the actual U.S. economy. According to both Leimer and Advisory Coun-
cil estimates, actual rates of return have fallen steadily through time. Under
current law, they will not fall as low as we projected in our stylized economy,
but that is because current law cannot be sustained. Our social security
system is in actuarial imbalance; that is, based on a 75-year horizon, the
present value of projected future tax revenues under current law is pro-
jected to be less than the present value offuture projected benefits by about
$3 trillion (Coss, forthcoming). Raising future taxes, or cutting benefits, to
bring the system into actuarial balance will reduce returns to levels very
close to those presented in our stylized model.
We also examine the Advisory Council money's worth estimates for three
reform plans involving investment in the stock market through a central
trust fund or individual accounts. Money's worth estimates for these plans
are higher than those for other reforms that restore actuarial balance by
raising taxes or cutting benefits. In fact, the more money a plan puts into the
stock market, the better it "looks" according to the money's worth mea-
sures. But this approach is incorrect, in that it replaces uncertain outcomes
with their expected values and then discounts them at the risk free rate. This
might have the effect of assigning a higher money's worth to one plan even
though everyone would be better off under some other plan. Money's worth
numbers must be adjusted to reflect risk. In general, how they should be
adjusted depends on a detailed knowledge of household preferences. Nev-
ertheless, we show that one does not need to know preference parameters
under four conditions pertaining to optimization, intergenerational trade-
offs, price stability, and spanning. Then market value defines a money's
worth measure with the property that any reform producing a higher
money's worth will also give higher welfare, independent of household pref-
erences. Under these conditions, one should not assign a money's worth of
$3.85 to $1 of stocks and a money's worth of $1 to $1 of bonds, yet in effect
this is what the Advisory Council does. In the real world, of course, one or
more of these conditions is likely to fail, so a utility-independent money's
wonh measure does not exist. We discuss how to modifY market value
money's wonh when some of the conditions are violated. This moves the
results toward the non-risk adjusted numbers, but by no means all the way.
Next, we apply the theoretical analysis to concrete reform proposals and
provide estimates of how money's worth measures should be modified. Rec-
ognizing that some households are constrained from holding stocks them-
selves, we find that there is likely to be a gain from social security diversi-
TABI.E I. Cash Flows in a Stylized PAYGO Social Security Model: Ongoing System
/,VH/ Cum I Calendar l'mr
Ill/I PVT NPV NPV Birth
(%) (%) ($/997) ($1997) Year 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1997 /998 2008 2018 2028 20]8 20'18 2058 2U68
5~ 94 !ROO ij.S
l\7~) 245.'-\ 1870 9.3 9.3
97.0 225~ 596 7KS6 jijijO -3.6 105 10.5
11.1 3% 1\93 12698 1890 -4.1 -4.1 11.8 11.8
4.7 162 193 15f,25 1900 -4.6 -4.6 -4.6 13.3 13.3
2.2 9" -ij 16352 1910 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 J.~.O 1!),{J
1.2 71 -166 1:')233 1920 -5.9 -5.9 -S.g -5.9 Hi.9 W.O 16.9
1.2 71 -149 1~672 \930 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 19.1 HI.1 19.1
1.2 7. -133 12271 1940 -7.5 -7.5 -7.tl -7.5 -7.:1 2l.:i 21.5
1.2 71 -120 11013 1950 -8.4 -8.4 -IH -HA -8.4 24.2 24.2
1.2 71 -107 9ijij, 1960 -9.0 -9.5 -9.' -9.5 -95 27.3 27.3
1.2 71 -96 8872 1970 -10.7 -10.7 -10.7 -10.7 -10.7 :l0.7 31l.7
1.2 71 -ij7 7963 1980 -12.0 -12.0 -12.0 -12.0 34.1; g-I.I\
1.2 71 -78 7147 1990 -135 -13..~ -13.5 -):\.:) 39,0 :'19.0
1.2 71 -70 6415 2000 -15.3 -I.~.:-I -1:,.3 -l!l.;i 43.9
1.2 71 -63 IftiS? 2010 -17.2 -17.2 -17.2 -17.2
1.2 71 -56 :)167 2020 -19.4 -19.4 -19.4
1.2 71 -!'IO 463K 20:\0 -21.ij -21.S
1.2 71 -45 416;\ 2040 -24.6
Total annual contrib\\tions -IS4 -207 -2~:{ -~tl3 -296 -S3:\ -371 -37[, -423 -477 -537 -f'ilft -fi82 -71il; -K65
Total annual benefits 1"4 207 2:1:\ 263 296 33:\ 371 375 423 477 537 !)D,=', fiH2 7tiH li65
Anllual deficit 0 I) 0 I) 0 0 I) 0 0 I) 0 11 I) II
PV (l997S) Oftl'USI fund" 0 0 0 I) 0 0 0 0 II 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Authors' calculations. See text for explanation. Entries are in billions of 1997$ unless indic.ated otherwise.
Notes: "Ongoing" refers to computations performed for an unfunded open ended Social Security program assumed to continue into the infinite future.
• Also equal tu cumulative NPV (1997$) of annual surplus.
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fication into stocks. But this gain is only about 20 percent as large as the
Advisory Council analysis has suggested.
We are sympathetic to policyrnakers' efforts to assess whether workers and
retirees get their money's worth from the social security system. Yet our
analysis shows that popular money's worth measures are often biased when
used to compare workers' and retirees' positions under different reform
scenarios. In particular, a correct money's worth calculation would show
that the net advantage of privatization and diversification are substantially
less than popularly perceived.'
Moneys Worth Measures in a Stylized Economy
To illustrate key issues, we begin with a stylized version of an unfunded
social security system in an overlapping generations economy model with
no uncertainty. We show how to calculate money's worth measures in this
economy; they are unambiguous and easy to compute. We then explain why
these money's worth measures are low under our current system, and use
this model to analyze the transition costs of moving to a privatized system.
Consider a matrix of numbers with each row (i) representing a birth year
and each column (j) representing a calendar year (see Table 1). For sim-
plicity we shall assume all individuals born in the same year are identical.
Entry (i,j) represents the total net cash flows in year j to or from all individ-
uals born in year i. Contributions (or taxes) are represented as negative
entries and benefits as positive entries.
Assume that all households enter the workforce at 20, retire at 60, and live
until age 80. People pay social security taxes each year they work and receive
social security benefits during each year of retirement. We let real earnings
for each cohort be constant over the worklife, but productivity growth and
population growth cause the aggregate earnings, social security taxes, and
social security benefits of households born in year t to be (I +g) times as
great as those of households born in year i. For this discussion, we also
assume that there is no uncertainty. The model is normalized so that total
social security benefit payments in the table are equivalent to actual aggre-
gate U.S. system benefits in 1997 (= $371 billion).
In keeping with the Advisory Council's predictions of future long run
productivity growth, we suppose that the rate ofgrowth g is 1.2 percent.4 We
further assume that our stylized social security system began in 1938 and will
continue to operate forever, as a pay-as-you-go (PAGYO) program with no
accumulated trust fund. That is, the model posits that every retired individ-
ual over the age of60 began to receive benefits in 1938, funded fully by taxes
raised on workers during that same year. These benefits are equal to what
the worker would have received, had he paid social security taxes (at the
same rate as current workers) all of his life. Likewise in each calendar year
thereafter we suppose the total of all taxes raised from workers is equal to
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tlte total of all benefits paid to retirees, Thus the sum of each column in
Table I is equal to zero. We display only pal"t of Table I, extending 75 years
inlO the future, but in principle these cash flows would continue infinitely
into the future, To make the table easier to read, every tenth row and
column of the underlying matrix are shown,
In this stylized framework, one can easily evaluate the different money's
worth statistics, All widely used measures of social security money's worth are
single numbers that are used to compare the stream of social security taxes
paid by an individual with the stream ofsocial security benefits received, We
focus on the three most popular measures. The real "internal rate of return"
(IRR) is the inflation-corrected discount rate that equates, for each individ-
ual, the present value of the stream of social security benefits to the present
value of the stream of the taxes paid. The "benefit/tax ratio" (PVB/PVT)
represents, fOI" each individual, the present value of lifetime social security
benefits received divided by the present value oflifetime social security taxes
paid. Finally, the "net present value" (NPV) is equal to the present value of
social security benefits minus the present value of taxes paid.'
The internal rate of return (IRR) for each cohort appea.rs as the first
column; computing it does not require a market interest rate (discount
rate). Column two lists the ratio of the present value of benefits lo the
present value of taxes for each cohort (PVB/PVT). The net present value of
benefits minus taxes (NPV) for each cohort i appears in the third column of
Table 1." Each present value is taken as ofI997, and uses the annual real rate
of interest (T) for discounting. We assume a value for ,'of2.3 percent. This is
approximately the arithmetic average of the annual real rate of interest
earned on intermediate maturity government bonds over the last 70 years,
as is shown below. It is also consistent with the Advisory Council's (1997)
estimate of the average future real rate of interest.
The fact that r is greater than g is very important to the qualitative fea-
tures ofa pay-as-you-go social security system such as the one sketched here,
although the exact magnitudes of the numbers are not. Ifinstead rwere less
than g forever, then any expansion of a pay-as-you-go social security system
would make everybody better off, at least up until the point that the market
interest rate r rose back to g. Indeed, if,' < g, it is not even possible to assign
a finite number to lOtal social secul"ity benefits. 7 Most economists, we be-
lieve, would subscribe to the idea that the real market rate of interest is
greater than the rate of growth of the economy.R
The supposition that r>g allows us to discount the future to a finite
number. But it also makes the past loom large. As we shall see, one extremely
important reason that our social security system imposes such a burden on
today's young is that the system transferred a great deal of wealth lo the
generations retiringjust after the Great Depression. Since r >g, the present
value in 1997 of a transfer in 1940 is a larger fraction of 1997 GDP than the
actual transfer was of its contemporaneous GDP.9
25 ,,----------------------------- 25
20
Birth year
Figure 1. Real internal rate of return on social security, stylized PAYGO model.
Source: Authors' calculations based on stylized PAYGO model.
Internal Rates of Return Must Fall in a Pay-as-You-Go
Social Security System
This framework generates a time series of lRR's by birth year, plotted in
Figure 1. Itwill be noted that lRRs start out very high: in fact they are infinite
for the very first set ofcohorts, fall to about 15-20 percent fOr early cohorts,
and then decline toward 1.2 percent. lO Early participants earned returns
much higher than the market rate of interest (2.3 percent, in our stylized
model), while later participants earned rates that were below the market
rate of interest. While not shown in the figure, Table I indicates that the
PVBjPVT ratio started out much above one and ended up below one.
Similarly, the NPV for each cohort is positive for early generations and
negative for later generations.
It is easy to see that the falling IRR is not a result peculiar to our example,
but instead is an outcome produced in any steadily growing economy with a
pay-as-you-go system. Generations born before] 918 received all their bene-
fits but did not pay taxes in some or all of their working years. Clearly, then,
their rate of return will be very high. By contrast, generations born after
- 20
15
10
o
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1918 pay taxes from the first year they work, so their internal rate of return
must be equal to the rate of growth g of the economy. II It must be empha-
sized that these deteriorating money's wonh patterns appear even though
we hold constant life expectancy and the age structure of the population.
That is, falling money's worth in this model is not due to the aging of baby
boomers, increased life expectancy, or massive administrative inefficiency,
but rather to the simple arithmetic of the pay-as-you-go system.
The Redistributive Implications of a Pay-as-You-Go
Social Security System
We next exploit the connection between lRR and NPV to explain why IRRs
must fall, and also to make clear the inherently redistributive nature of a
pay-as-you-go social security system. Recall that IRR is greater than the rate
of intel'est if and only if NPV is greater than zero. The analytical advantage
of NPV over IRR is that NPVs can be aggregated. In a pay-as-you-go social
security system, the sum of the NPVs across all cohorts must be zero. If one
cohon gets net benefits from the system, the other cohorts must pay. If one
cohort has an IRR bigger than r, some other cohort must have an IRR less
than r. We now explain why.
The entry for the ith row of the fourth column of Table 1 is the cumula-
tive NPV: that is, the sum of the third column across all rows up to and
including row i. We can see that after 1910 or so, the number steadily drops
toward 0 as we go down the column (i.e., as i increases). We claim that, in a
steady state economy in which r > g, this cumulative NPV must always tend to
zero as igrows indefinitely large.
Since the entries in the matrix in Table I grow at rate gbut are discounted
back at rate r>g, we can safely sum present values over all the infinite
entries after the system began in 1938. We need not worry about diverging
series or the order in which we take the sums and present values. Each
column in Table 1 sums to zero because the system is pay-as-you-go. il follows
that the present value of each column sum must equal zero, and therefore
that the sum across aU columns of these present values must be zero as well.
Changing the orders of summation and present value, it follows that the
sum of the present value of all the rows must also be zero, as claimed. 12
Since the early generations under the system receive large net present
value surpluses from social security, it follows that, on average, current and
future generations must lose money to social security (in present value
terms). In an unfunded PAYGO system every generation after the initial few
must lose money in present value terms under social security. Because rates
of return were high for the first generations, rates of return must be low for
later generations.
In this stylized example we supposed that the social security system never
built up a trust fund. The same logic applies, however, if the system borrows
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money or accumulates a trust fund: in either case, the sum of the NPVs
across all generations must be zero. It is only necessary that the trust fund
borrows and invests at the rate of interest r, and that the contemporaneous
value of the trust fund grows at a rate smaller than r. Under these circum-
stances, the present value as of a fixed year (say 1997) of the trust fund will
increase from some year T to T +1 only to the extent that taxes exceed
benefits in that year (in present value). In other words, the cumulative NPV
of the column sums up to any year Tplus the present value of the trust fund
in year T must sum to zero for all T. If the contemporaneous value of the
trust fund grows at a rate less than r, then the presen t value of the trust fund
must eventually converge to zero. Hence the cumulative column NPV must
also converge to zero. As above, this implies that as we go to the limit the
cumulative cohort (row) NPVs also converge to zero.
Consider, for example, a variation on Table 1 in which income grows
faster than g for some years, say from 1938 to 1973, and then reverts to a
growth rate ofg forever after. Suppose the tax rales are the same as in Table 1
and held constant forever, and the benefit rates are held constant at least
until 1973 and increased sometime thereafter. Then the social security sys-
tem would build up a trust fund in the years up to 1973, from which it could
ultimately increase benefits. This, however, would not change the previous
conclusions. To the extent that early generations receive benefits in excess
of their contributions, later generations must make up the deficit. The
presence of the trust fund is a sign that previous NPVs and IRRs were not as
high as they could have been. In and of itself, the presence of the trust fund
is not sufficient for future IRRs to be above r.
Investment Illusion
Many people look at their low money's worth numbers from social security
and assume that these must be the result of systemic administrative ineffi-
ciency. Because social security taxes are paid early in life and benefits are
received later in life, they tend to think of the taxes as investments paying
inadequate dividends. These people believe that, if their contributions
could instead be invested in capital markets, they would achieve a higher
benefit. However, this perception suffers from investment illusion, since
social security taxes should instead be thought of as payments on an old
debt. This can be illustrated by imagining a sickly patriarch with no money
facing huge medical bills. His children might be called upon to pay the
bills. If the expenses were sufficiently high and the number of children
sufficiently low, one might imagine that the third generation, the grand-
children, would also be asked to pay. They could do so by waiting until they
grew up and their parents got old to give them some money, thus partly
repaying and also reenacting their parents' gift to the patriarch. If the bills
were astronomically high, and the children and grandchildren together
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could not afford them in their entirety, the debt might be rolled over to the
fourth generation, the great-grandchildren. By renewing the gift each gen-
eration, all the descendants of the patriarch can share in the paying of his
medical bills. Each generation would pay money when young, and receive
less back when old. This fourth generation might never have known or even
heard of the patriarch, yet as a result of his legacy they would be born into an
obligation to their parents. Not knowing or caring about the health of the
patriarch, they might be tempted to renege on the debt and let him face the
consequences of less medical care. But by the time they would make this
decision his life and illness and medical care would have already come and
gone. Defaulting on the debt would hurt not the patriarch but rather the
third generation, their parents. This would likely prove difficult to do.
Our social security system functions something like this parable of the
family and the sick patriarch. As illustrated earlier, initial cohorts attain-
ing old age after the Great Depression received a net transfer, in turn impos-
ing costs on succeeding generations-perhaps long after they and the
reasons they needed so much care have been forgotten. Furthermore, by
the iron logic of compound interest, payment deferred is payment in-
creased; thus $100 borrowed once at 2.3 percent real interest requires pay-
ment of $2.30 plus an inflation correction every year in perpetuity, long
after the purpose of the original loan is forgotten.'3 It is tempting to think
that the small number of early generations receiving the transfer and the
mbust economic growth of the last five decades must surely dwarf the tiny
transfers made when the social security system was established. Indeed, if
this parable were only about one family, its subsequent success might even-
tually enable succeeding children to payoff the original loan in its entirety.
But this is not the case for an entire economy, since the technological
breakthroughs that enriched the economy also helped to maintain high real
interest rates, rates that increased the burden of the repayment. 14 In addi-
tion, many generations subsequent to the first did not help pay the interest
or repay the principal of the initial implicit debt but instead received
transfers themselves that caused the implicit debt to grow faster than the
rate of interest.
The Unfunded Liability of Social Security
An important question relevant to the current social security reform debate
is what would happen if the current system were shut down and replaced by
a different system. In such an eventuality, we believe it inconceivable that
previously promised benefits would be completely eliminated. The cohort
of 1938, for example, which worked and paid into the old system for 40
years, could not be abandoned without benefits at the age of60 if the system
were shut down in 1998.
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To give an idea of policy alternatives using our stylized model, we evaluate
a "1997 shut-down" scenario which includes only contributions made and
benefits received through 1997, plus future benefits accrued based on con-
tributions through 1997 but to be paid after 1997. The present value as of
1997 of all accrued future benefits (PVAB'997) represents benefits already
"earned" by workers in the system. These are the liabilities that people in
our stylized example might be worried about losing if circumstances sud-
denly changed. If, for example, the population did not continue to grow at
the same rate, or if future taxes were reduced, or if the system shut down,
these accrued benefits might be in jeopardy. In general, the unfunded
liability as of the end of 1997 (UL I997) is defined as the present value of
these accrued benefits (in 1997 dollars) minus any accumulated trust fund
(IT'997); i.e., UL'997 = PVAB'997 - TF'''''7' There are no assets in the system
to guarantee these unfunded liabilities, except the implicit promise of the
government to tax future generations.!.; In our pure pay-as-you-go example
there is no accumulated trust fund, so the unfunded liability of the system is
simply equal to the present value of all accrued benefits.
It is not necessarily obvious how accrued benefits would be assigned in the
event of an actual shutdown of the current social security system; one can
think of several potential formulas. The first approach we will call the
"straight line" method. Suppose that a system shutdown occurred in 1997,
at which point a given worker has labored for s years out of the normal 40.
That worker would then be entitled, after age 60, to a benefit worth sj40 of
the value that he would have received had the system continued in opera-
tion and had he continued to work until age 60, at the same average real
wage. The straight line accrued benefits as of 1997 in our stylized example
are presented in the penultimate line of Table 2a. In the last line we com-
pute their present value (that is, the unfunded liability) to be $9.1 trillion
($1997).
One might say that the straight line method provides a lower bound on
social security's unfunded liability, because a dollar of contributions in the
last year of a worker's career yields the same benefits as a dollar contributed
40 years earlier. By contrast, if the worker could have deposited his or her
contributions in the bank, a dollar contributed at age 20 would yield much
more at age 61 than a dollar contributed at age 60. By ignoring the time
value of money, the straight line method gives smaller rates of return, and
smaller benefit/tax ratios to younger workers at the time of shutdown. In
columns I and 2 of Table 2a, we see that IRR and PVBjPVT decline as the
cohorts get younger at shutdown. PVBjPVT, for example, drops all the way
to 51 percent.
An alternative formula for accrued benefits, which we call the constant
IRR method, assigns accrued benefits so that a worker gets the same internal
rate of return on actual taxes and benefits as he or she would have earned
TARLE 2a. Cash Flows in a Stylized PAYGO Social Security Model: Shutdown Case (Straight Line Method)
PVIJ/ Cum Calendar Yt'ar
INN PVT NPV NPV Birth
1%) 1%) 1$1997) 1$1997) Year 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1997 1998 2008 2018 2028 2038 21J48 21J58 2068
fi3 94 IH60 H.:l
:\79 245~ 1870 9.~ 9.~
97.0 2211~ 596 jSS6 lHRO -:\.6 10.5 10.5
11.1 ~~6 ~9~ 12fi9R lH90 -4.1 -4.1 11.8 11.8
4.7 Ili~ Hl:\ 15525 1900 -4.6 -4.6 -4.6 13.3 13.3
2.:! 98 -8 Iti35:! lYIO -;1.2 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 15.0 15.0
1.::1 71 -166 15~:{3 1920 -5.9 -5.9 -5.9 -5.9 16.9 16.9 16.9
1.2 71 -119 13672 1930 -6.fi -6.6 ~6.6 -6.6 19.1 HU 19.1
U! 70 -I~':) 12268 1940 -7.5 -7.5 -7.5 -7.5 20.4 20.4
1.0 63 -120 10984 1950 -8.4 -8.4 -N.1 16.9 16.9
O.~ :">7 -90 9936 19GO -9.5 -9.5 12.3 12.3
0.8 51 -45 9271 ]970 -10.7 6.1 6.1
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
TlIlal annual contributions (past) -184 -207 -2~~ -263 -296 -~3:'\ -171
Towl annual cOlltributiuI1S (aftel' shutdown) I) 0 I) 0 (J
Toltll <lnnll<l] bt'lll;tiL~ (p,Ut) 184 207 2:13 263 296 33~\ 371
Tll\al annuallx·ndll." (accrued as ol"shutdown) :\7[, ~9Z :H7 2,m I.~R ~!)
PV ($1997) bt:nelil1; aCCflled as ofShilldowII 9106
Source: Authors' calculations. See text for details. Entries are in billions of 1997$ unless otherwise indicated.
Notes: "Shutdown" refers to computations performed for an unfunded Social Security program terminated in 1998. Benefits accrued prior to 1998 are assumed
to be paid. but no future benefits are accrued. Method for accrual: straight line.
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having worked until 60 at the same average wage. Since the conSClllt IRR
method gives some time value to money, the accrued benefits are somewhat
larger with this method than with the straight line method. Table 2b pre-
sents the accrued benefits with the constant IRR method for our stylized
example. Note that the IRR in column 1 remains constant at 1.2 percent.
The unfunded liability now works out to $9.5 trillion.
Goss (forthcoming) proposed a method of calculating accrued benefits
that closely resembles the straight line method, and that agrees with it when
there is no productivity growth in the economy. When there is positive
growth, the Goss method lies somewhere between the straight line method
and the constant 1RR method.
The simplest approach to figuring accrued benefits, which we term the
"constant benefit/tax ratio method," or "constant benefit" method for
short, provides that each dollar of social security contributions generates
the same $bin benefits in pl'esent value terms (discounted back to the year
the contribution was made). For our stylized case, bequals 0.71, which is the
ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of contributions
for any generation that contributed to the program over a 40-year work1ife.
Table 2c summarizes the result of implementing the constant benefit/tax
ratio method. Since the constant benefit/tax ratio method fully recognizes
the time value of money, we would expect to see the highest accrued bene-
fi ts under this method. Indeed, we find that the unfunded liability works out
to be $9.9 trillion. The divergence between methods for calculating accrued
benefits may become an important source of controversy if social security is
ever shut down and workers stake their claims to accrued benefits,
The annual social security transfer. Table 1 reports the present value of the
transfer that each birth cohort makes or receives over the course of its life
after the economy reaches the steady state (where generations pay taxes for
the full 40 years), Another way oflooking at the transfer is in annual terms
for all cohorts together. The transfer a cohort makes in year t is the differ-
ence between the contributions it makes in that year and the present value
of the benefits those contributions bring, which in turn depends on the
formula for accrued benefits. In the simplest case, where there is a constant
benefit/ tax ratio, 29 cents on every dollar of contributions is transferred to
payoff the implicit debt. In 1998 for example, Table 1 tells us that total
contributions are $375 billion. We know that those households will only get
back 71 cents on each dollar in present value of benefits. Hence the transfer
made that year, in 1998 dollars, is (.29) X ($375 billion) = $108.8 billion.
Had we used the straight line method or the constant rate of return method
for generating accrued benefits, the transfer would have been slighdy lower
(because under these methods households would have already given up
greater transfers in prior years).
No matter how accrued benefits are calculated in a steady state economy
the transfers made by all cohorts in year t + 1 must equal (r - g) X (un-
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19""
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~WOO
2010
2020
2()~O
2040
TI)tal unnllalumlribuliollS (past) -IR4 -~)7 -2~~ -26:\ -296 -:tt\ -:iil
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"
0 0 0 0 0
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Source: Authors' calculations. See text t()f delails, Entries are in billions of 1997$ unless indicated otherwise.
NOles: "Shutdown" refers to computations performed for an unfunded Social Security program terminated in 1998. Benefits accrued prior lO 1998 arc assumed
to be paid, but no future benefits are accrued. Method for accrual: IRR ~ 1.2%
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funded liability at the end of year I). For instance, under the constant
benefits/tax ratio plan, we calculated above that transfers in 1998 = $108.8
billion. Define UL, as the unfunded liability at the end ofyear I. Ifwe instead
calculate the transfers as (-r - g) X ULt997, this equals (.023 - .012) X ($9.9
trillion) = $108.8 billion. The same would hold true under the other plans,
though the transfer is harder to compute. Let us see why.
Consider what would happen if the system did not shut down until 1998
rather than in 1997. Recall that UL, = PVAB, - TF,. This implies that:
The change in the presen t value of accrued benefits from 1997 to 1998 can
be derived as the sum of three terms. It includes first a term r X PVAB1!l97
because the old accrued benefits are now one year closer, and so their
present value must go up by the rate of interest between 1997 and 1998.
Second, accrued benefits are increased according to the benefit formula
!(C'998)' as a result of the additional contributions made in 1998 (C'998)'
Third, unfunded liabilities are diminished by the benefits Bt99" paid out
in 1998. Thus:
The transfer (TRANS) in 1998 is the difference between contributions in
1998 and the corresponding change in accrued benefits. Defining the an-
nual social security surplus (SUR) as the difference between annual contri-
butions and annual benefits, 16 we have:
TRANS'99I< = C t998 - !(C'998),
APVAB'!l97.1Y98 = rX PVAB'!l97 - TRANS'''''8 + SUR
'
''''8'
Similarly, we can decompose the change in the trust fund from 1997 to 1998
into three components. First, it increases by r X TF'997 because it earns
interest. Second, it rises due to additional contributions made in 1998, and
third, it falls due to benefits paid during 1998. This gives:
Putting these together yields:
AULI'J97.'998 = APVABI'I'J7.'!l98 - ATF'997.'998
= rX (PVABl99, - TF,997 ) - TRANS",." + SUR,998 - SURtY9•
= (r X UL,••,) - TRANS,99.'
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TABLE '\. Social Security Present Values by Birth Year: Stylized PAYGO Model
.
pVo/Past PVofFuture PVofFuture
Benefits Benefits Benefits to be Row
Received Less Already Accrued Less Total
PVofPast Acerued Future (NPV
Contributions Based on Past Contributions from Cumulative
Birth Year Age in 1997 Made Contributions to he Made Table 1) Row Total
IH59-1917 80+ (dead) 15.7" 0" Ob 15.7' 15.7
1918-1937 60-79 (living -6.2" 3.1" Ob -3.1' 12.6
and retired)
1938-1977 20-59 (living -9.5" 6.0" -.9" -4.4' H.2
and working)
1978+ :0;19 (not yet 0" 0" -8.2 -8.2 0
working or not
yet born)
Total 0<1 9.1 -9.1 0
Source: Authors' calculations.
.. Derived from Table 2a.
h Derived from Tables 1 and 2a.
, Derived from Table 1.
d Equal to accumulated trust fund (=0 since system is PAYGO).
Rewriting this gives TRANS9R = r X UL1997 - 6.ULl997.l99R'
Next, realize that in a steady state system all the accrued benefits in ma-
trices 2a,b,c must grow at the rate gas the shutdown year rises. In particular,
comparing the 1998 and 1997 shutdown scenarios shows UL,99R = (l +g) X
ULl997 or 6.UL,997,l99R = g X UL,997, no matter how accrued benefits and
hence unfunded liabilities were measured (provided they are linear func-
tions of all the contributions). Putting these together, we get TRANS,99R =
(r - g) X ULl997, as was to be shown. We deduce that the transfer made in
1998 under the straight line method of figuring accrued benefits is $100,1
billion = (0,023 - 0,012) X ($9.1 trillion). Under the constant ratio
method it is $104.5 billion = (0.023 - 0.012) X ($9.5 trillion).
Table 3 summarizes the transfers for different cohorts and distinguishes
between the transfers paid in the past and those to be paid in the future, in
this stylized model. (Later we offer a similar table based on actual U.S. data.)
For illustrative purposes, the cohorts are collected into four groups: past
participants no longer alive (birth years 1859-1917), those currently alive
and retired (birth years 1918-1937), those currently alive and working
(birth years 1938-1977), and those currently too young to be working or not
yet born (birth years 1978+). The column labeled row total gives the NPV
(or net subsidy) aggregated from Table 1.
The early birth cohorts (those no longer living in 1997) received net
subsidies of $15.7 trillion (in 1997 present value dollars). Subsequent co-
96 Social Security Moneys Worth
hort~will receive negative net subsidies; that is, they will pay transfers. If the
system continues, those currently living and retired will pay $3.1 trillion in
net transfel-s, those currendy working will pay another $4.4 trillion in net
transfers, and those yet to be born will pay $8.2 trillion in net transfers.
The next step is to determine how much of that total transfer has already
been made and how much is yet to be collected. For those already dead or
not yet working, the answers are obvious. But for those who are currently
wOI-king or retired, we need to use a combination of Tables 1 and 2a. The
third column of Table 3 gives the present value of past cash flows and the
fourth column gives the present value of future benefits already accrued
(both from Table 2a)Y The sum of these two is the net subsidy (positive
entries) or net transfer (negative entries) based on contributions already
made. The fifth column is calculated based on the difference between
Tables 1 and 2a, and is equal to the net subsidy to be received based on
future cash flows. In this stylized model, current workers have already paid
$3.5 trillion more than they have accrued (= -9.5 + 6.0), leaving only a
$0.9 trillion net transfer to be paid based on future contributions.
Reform Options in the Stylized Economy
We turn next to a brief evaluation of reform options in this stylized econ-
omy. To do so it is useful to clarifY three often-confused terms: privatization,
prefunding, and diversification of social security. J" By privatization, we
mean replacing the current social security system with a defined contribu-
tion system of individual accounts held in workers' names. By prefunding,
we mean reducing the system's unfunded liability, whether explicit or im-
plicit. And by diversification, we mean investing social security funds in a
variety of private capital market assets, via either individual accounts 01- the
social security trust fund. These concepts are distinct. It is possible for a
reform plan to implement anyone or two without the other(s). In what
follows we focus on reforms with prefunding and privatization; in subse-
quent sections we take up the diversification issue in detail.
Privatizing social security without prefunding does not improve welfare in the
stylized economy. Consider what would happen in this stylized economy if the
social security system were privatized so that all new contributions were
channeled into individual accounts.'9 Suppose that all past contributions
were ignored and no benefits accrued under the current system were paid.
In this case, all future social security taxes would earn the market return of
2.3 percent, almost double the 1.2 percent under the current system. But
then the entire $15.7 trillion cost of subsidizing cohorts born prior to 1917
would, in effect, be carried by the cun-ent middle-aged and old who would
then have paid into the system for years without being entided to any bene-
fits. Column 3 ofTable 3 shows that current retirees would lose $6.2 trillion
and current workers would lose $9.5 trillion.
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Alternatively, one could shut down the old system and privatize but con-
tinue to pay all benefits accrued to date, based on past contributions. Recog-
nition bonds could be issued to workers and retirees for the full amount of
their accrued benefits. The $15.7 trillion burden carried by current workers
and retirees would then be reduced to $6.6 trillion (= 15.7 - (3.1 + 6.0));
the recognition bonds would equal the system's current unfunded liability
of$9.1 trillion. If the government did not default on these bonds, new taxes
would have to be raised to pay interest on the recognition bonds. One way to
do so would be to set the new taxes to keep the path over time of recognition
bond debt the same as the path of implicit debt under the current system. 20
In this event, these new taxes would correspond exactly to the transfers
described in the last section. In other words, it can be shown that the new
taxes raised would eliminate all the higher returns on individual accounts.
Current workers and retirees would themselves face extra taxes, which
would raise their net loss back to the $7.5 trillion (= 3.1 + 4.4) it was
scheduled to be under the current system. Let us see why.
As pointed out earlier, the implicit tax paid in each year through the
continuing social security system is (r-g) X (the unfunded liability at the
end of the previous year). If suddenly, at the end of 1997, social security
were privatized and recognition bonds were issued, their market value
would have to equal the unfunded liability of$9.1 trillion (or to $9.9 trillion
if accrued benefits are calculated according to the constant PVBjPVT
method). The government would then have a choice whether to payoff the
recognition bond coupon payments in their entirety as they came due or to
roll over some of the debt. Suppose the government decided to keep the
recognition bond debt growing at the same rate g as the economy. Then
taxes in 1998 would have to be raised in the amount (r - g) X (unfunded
liability of 1997). The extra taxes needed to finance the payments on the
recognition bonds would thus be identical to the transfers made in the old
social security system. This is true, notjust for 1998 but, by the same logic for
every year thereafter. By choosing the tax rates appropriately, the tax bur-
den could be made to fall exactly on the same people who were con tributing
more to social security than they were receiving in benefits. 21 Aside from the
transfers, participants in the current pay-as-you-go social security system are
in effect earning the bond rate of return on their money. In a privatized
system in which households invested their forced saving in bonds, they
would have to pay in new taxes exactly what they paid before in transfers.
To emphasize this point, Table 4 presents a simplified two-period version
of the stylized economy. For each cohort, all the work years are summa-
rized into one period (period 1) and all the retirement years into another
(period 2). Under the pay-as-you-go system, all period 1 contributions by the
young (TI ) are used to fund benefits to the old (also = TI ). From the
vantage point of period 0, the present value of these benefits, equal here to
the unfunded liabilities, is TI j (I + r). Since aggregate wages grow at rate g,
TABLE 4. Rates of Return with Privatization but no Prefunding in a Two-Period Model
time-.
Current style PAYGO system.
o 2 3
payments by young 1',1 (1+g) 1', T,(l+g) 1',(l+g)2
receipts by old 1',1 (I +g) 1', T,(I+g) T,(l+g)"
rate of return g g g
unfunded liability' 1',1 (I +1") 1', (I +g) I (I +1') 1', (I +g)"1 (1+/") 1',(I+g)'/(1+r)
Privatized system. with no prefunding (that begins in period 1)
outstanding "recognition bond" debt 1',1 (I +1') 1', (1 +g)1 (I +1') T,(1+g)'/(I+r) 1',(1 +g)'/(I +1')
payments by young (= deposits to accts ignoring 1', 1',(I+g) 1', (I +g)"
tax)
receipts by old (ignoring tax) 1', 1', (1+1') T,(I+g)(I+r)
rate of return (ignoring transition tax) r r r
payments by young 1', 1', (1+ g) 1',(1 +g)"
new taxes on young to finance debt payments (r-g) 1',1 (1 +1') (1'- g) 1', (I+g) I (1+1') (r-g) 1', (1 +g)"1 (I +1')
net deposits to individual accounts (after new 1', (1 +g) I (1+1') 1', (I +g)21 (I +1') T,(I+g)'/(I+r)
taxes)
receipts by old 1', T,(l+g) T,(l+g)'
rate of return (including transition tax) g g g
Notes:
, Unfunded liability after taxes received and benefits paid for the period.
g= growth rale of wage base = rate ofrelurn on social security under current PAYGO system.
t' = real riskless rate of return = rate of return on privatized system ignoring transition CosL"i > g
Privatization occurs by issuinK recognition bonds (0 pay for accrued benefits (roHing over enough interest and principal to keep the debt/GOP ratio
constant), and channeling all new contributions into individual accounts.
John Geanakoplos. Olivia S. Mitchell. and Stephen P. Zeldes 99
the young in period 2 will contribute T, (1 +g), the same amount that will be
paid out to the old. The rate of return that young households will receive on
their period 1 social security payments is [T, (1 +g) I Td - 1 = g.
What would be the effect of privatizing the social security system just after
time O? This could be accomplished by leaving social security tax rates un-
disturbed but, from time t = 1 onward, putting all future social security
contributions into individual accountS invested in bonds instead of transfer-
ring them to the old. The generation that is young in period I, and every
succeeding generation, would then receive when old the returns from the
riskless asset. To make payments to the period 1 old, "recognition bonds"
would need to be issued to fully cover the presen t value of the social security
benefits they would have received under PAYGO. If these bonds were issued
in period 0, they would have to be ofsize T, I (1 +'-), namely the outstanding
unfunded liabilities.2'l
If we ignore any additional taxes to pay interest on these recognition
bonds, then all the contributions of the period 1 young are paid directly into
individual accounts. In period 2, these households will receive a payout
from their accounts of T, (l +,-); that is, they will receive rate of rettlrn ,- > g
on their contributions. However this does not reflect their net proceeds,
since the government must also collect n£w tmnsition taxes to pay at least
some of the interest on the new recognition bonds.
Each period t > 0, the government must either payoff the recognition
bond debt by raising new transition taxes, or roll it over by borrowing again
from the generation t young. Suppose the government were to collect only
enough new transition taxes to keep the outstanding debt from the recogni-
tion bonds growing at the same rate as the economy (g), that is, keeping the
debt/GOP ratio constant. Then at each date t the value of the outstanding
recognition bonds would be exactly equal to the unfunded liability under
the old pay-as-you-go system. New transition taxes (assumed for simplicity to
be raised on the young) would initially (in period 1) have to equal (,-- g)
T, I (l + r) .2' Therefore, net deposits into individual accounts (these taxes
are paid) would equal T, - (,--g) 7~/(1+,-) = T,(1+g)/(1+r). When
they are old, they will get back this amount multiplied by (1+1'), which
equals T, (1 +g). Since they pay T, and receive back T, (1 +g), the net rate of
return to the old people, after taking account of the tax to finance the
relevant interest payments on the recognition bonds, is exactly g! In other
words, participants under the privatized system receive the identical rate of
return as under the unfunded pay-as-you-go system. This is true not just in
period 2 but in all subsequent periods as well. It is also true regardless how
large the difference is between rand g.24
Notice also that the pattern of payments in a privatized system with the
above debt path is identical to the pattern of payments in a pay-as-you-go
system. Generation I's investment in the riskless asset when young is tanta-
mount to buying the recognition bonds when it is young via its privatized
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social security account. Generation 1 then cashes out (i.e., it sells the bonds)
to generation 2 when it is old. As before, generation 1 gives up money when
it is young and receives money when it is old (previously called social se-
curity benefits, and here called interest and principal on bonds). Thus in a
dynamically efficient economy in which the market return is T, the return to
the social security participant is g < T, because the transfer each generation
makes to the start-up generation is on the order of T - g.
This point is a general one. When money's worth measures exclude the
extra transition taxes needed to finance interest payments on the recogni-
tion bonds, they yield a misleading indicator of the value of switching to a
privatized system. In this example, there is no change in any net cash Rows
to any households, yet the naive money's worth comparison would indicate
a large gain moving from a pay-as-you-go system to a privatized system.""
Privatizing and pTefunding social security. Suppose, alternatively, that taxes
were raised disproportionately on current cohorts so that the outstanding
value of recognition bond debt started out lower, and/ or grew over time at a
rate slower than g (possibly even decreasing over time). ]n this case, privatiza-
tion would be accompanied by prefunding. This outcome is favored by many
economists, who believe that social security prefunding would increase na-
tional saving. 21i Prefunding could also occur under the current system if taxes
were raised or benefits cut and the proceeds deposited into a central trust
fund. Many also believe that prefunding is more likely to occur if accompa-
nied by some privatization, on the political argument that Congress is less
likely to increase government spending or cut taxes outside social security if
the accumulation of any increased social security surplus is done in private
accounts ratherthan through a central trust fund (see, e.g., Feldstein 1998a).
How prefunding would change cohort-specific money's worth measures
is of some interest. The higher prefunding diminishes the recognition
bond debt facing later cohorts, and consequently prefunding reduces taxes
needed to repay the interest on this smaller debt. For these later cohorts,
then, returns earned on social security contributions net of recognition
bond taxes are higher than anticipated under the current system. But for
current workers, returns on a prefunded system net of the higher taxes are
inevitably lower than under the current system. For this reason, it should be
clear that the current debate should focus on whether this tradeoff is worth
making, rather than whether there is a free lunch D
Money'S Worth Measures in Practice
We now turn to money's worth measures calculated for the actual economy,
as opposed to the stylized system described above. 2R Money's worth measures
figured prominently in the Social Security Advisory Council's recent report
(1997), where the Council compared outcomes under benchmarks based
on the current system with outcomes under three specific reform plans.""
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Practical Issues in Measuring Moneys Worth
In calculating money's worth estimates, a number of practical questions
arise. In this section, we discuss the most important of these.
Should estimates be based on actual cohort data or hypothetical worker data? Two
approaches to computing cohort meaSUl-es of social security money's worth
are prevalent in the literature. One technique is to use actual administrative
data on all individuals (or on a sample of individuals) in a cohort, following
them over their worklives and into retirement. This micro-based approach
relies on longitudinal data, usually the Social Security Administration's Con-
tinuous Work History Sample (CWHS); among those taking this tack are
Leimer (1994) and Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees (1993).
A second technique calculates tax and benefit profiles for hypothetical
workers or households. This approach is much simpler since actual people
do not have to be tracked over time, and for this reason it is the more
prevalent appmach in policy settings.3<J For example, the Office of the Actu-
ary at the Social Security Administration (SSA) used the simulated worker
approach in its money's worth analysis for the Advisory Council (1997) .31 It
must be noted that the SSA hypothetical earnings profiles are not derived
from actual cohort specific age-earnings profiles. Rather, the SSA "average"
worker experiences earnings growth at the same rate as the growth in
economy-wide average covered earnings. Of course, there is no theoretical
reason for these to be the same. For example, economy-wide earnings
growth could be zero, even though each individual cohort might enjoy
5 percent per annum (or for that matter any arbitrarily high) real wage
growth over its lifetime due to experience-related productivity growth. Al-
ternatively, economy-wide earnings growth could be 1.2 percent even if no
individual experienced any real wage growth over his or her lifetime; this
was assumed in the stylized example of the last section. Hence social security
taxes paid and benefits received for the SSA "average" simulated earner
will almost certainly misrepresent taxes and benefits of an actual cohort.
Whether the bias is consistently positive or negative is a subject for fu-
ture research.
lWiich taxes and benefits should be included? In computing money's worth
measures, experts disagree about which social security payroll taxes should
be included. For instance, some actuaries offer these computations using
only taxes paid by employees (e.g., Myers and Schoebel 1992). By con-
trast, most economists contend that taxes paid by employers should also
be included in the money's worth computation, because workers pay for
employer-side social security taxes out ofreduced wages (Gruber 1995). The
estimates we present below include both the employee and the employer-
side contributions, that is, the full 12.4 percent payroll tax currently dedi-
cated to the program.
A related issue pertains to which social security benefits should be con-
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sidered and to whom they should be attributed. Some previous studies ex-
amine only retirement benefits, which overlooks the important role of
disability payments available through the social insurance system. Other
studies have focused only on single worker benefits, which ignores the im-
portant spouse and survivor benefits payable if an insUl'ed worker with de-
pendents dies. The Office of the Actuary appropriately, in our view, counts
the entire l'e1evant set of benefits including retiree, spouse, survivor, and
disability insurance payments in its money's worth calculations.~"If spouse
and survivor benefits are included, there is the added question of which
birth cohort these should be attributed to - the male or female member of
the married couple, or the children. The Office of the Actuary makes the
simplifying assumption that the husband and wife are of the same age, and
attributes children's benefits to the workers' cohort.~~ By contrast, Leimer
(1994) assumes that benefits paid to a surviving spouse or dependent child,
for example, accrue to that spouse's or child's birth cohort, rather than the
cohort of the working member(s) of the household.
Should histmcal social security taxes and benefits be computed ex-ante VT ex-post?
When comparing social security benefit and tax streams, the question arises
as to whether money's worth computations should be undertaken on an ex-
ante or ex-post basis. In other words, should actual histories be used for
taxes, benefits, and opportunity costs of funds, or should expected values be
employed? If expected values are used, as of what date or on what informa-
tion set should the measures be conditioned?
In practice, most estimates use realized (or ex-post) macroeconomic data
on earnings, real interest rates, and tax and benefit rules.34 They also use
realized values ofcohort earnings (for actual cohort estimates) or economy-
wide earnings (for hypothetical worker estimates). Actual mortality patterns
are also used to determine the size of the taxpaying population through
time, by cohort."
How shvuld future taxes and benefits be forecasted? To analyze the money's
worth of social security for generations that are still living, future taxes and
benefits by cohort need to be forecasted. These forecasts, and therefore the
resulting money's worth estimates, are highly dependent on underlying
estimates of future economic and demographic factors, along with fore-
casted paths for future social security benefit and tax rules. In each case, of
course, there is ample room for professional disagreement. Demographers
disagree about what is the best forecast of future fertility, immigration pat-
terns, and mortality. Economists disagree about the best forecast of real
wage growth, labor force participation, retirement patterns, disability rates,
and unemployment, as well as the magnitude of behavioral effects. Yet
others argue about future evasion rates. There is also controversy about
whether the economic and demographic forecasts are internally consistent;
a discussion of the assumptions used to make social security forecasts is
provided by the Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (1997).:16
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Money's worth calculations are inevitably a mix of historical and fore-
casted data. Measures for cohorts retiring when the system was new, in the
1940s and 1950s, reflect mainly ex-post data for taxes, benefits, discount
rates, and mortality. More recent system entrants are not yet fully retired,
and few have died as yet. As a result, the more recent is the birth cohort, the
less important are historical data and the more important are ex-ante fore-
casts for money's worth estimates.
VVhat discount rate should be used? Two of the three money's worth mea-
sures, NPV and PVB/PVT, require the selection of a rate to discount cash
flows. In practice, the SSA discounts past real benefit and tax flows using a
rate equal to the realized historical real yield on trust fund assets. To dis-
count future flows, the agency uses the intermediate assumptions for the
real rate on U.S. Treasury Special Public Debt Obligations.,n No adjustment
is made to the discount rate to take into account the riskiness of the cash
flows, an important issue that we return to below.3s
Finally, to compare net present values across cohorts, the dollar tax and
benefit amounts must be expressed in common units. 39 Leimer (1994) uses
interest rates to convert into a common year's dollars. By contrast, the Office
of the Actuary expresses all dollar figures in constant wage units, by calculat-
ing present values as of age 22 and converting these to a common year's
dollars using the actual past and the expected future nominal wage index.
Policy Analysts' Moneys Worth Estimates
In this section, we present money's worth estimates based on "real world"
data on the U.S. system, and compare these with estimates from the stylized
model contained in Table 1. We present estimates of money's worth mea-
sures under current law and various reform proposals.
Present law and reforms that leave intact the basic structure ofsocial security. We
begin with estimates based on historical data and current U.S. law; this
benchmark is commonly termed the "Present Law" (PL) case. We hasten to
add, however, that the system is in actuarial imbalance: that is, the present
value of expected future benefits exceeds the trust funds plus the present
value ofexpected future contributions.40 For this reason, present law is not a
particularly useful benchmark. We therefore also examine two reforms that
keep the basic structure of social security the same, but either raise taxes or
cut benefits to eliminate the 75-year actuarial imbalance. The "Holdtax"
reform maintains current tax rates constant and cuts benefits sufficiently to
make the payouts consistent with the revenue raised. The "Holdben" re-
form keeps benefit formulas constant, but assumes taxes are increased as
needed to finance these benefits.4l
An excellent study of cohort money's worth using administrative data is
that of Leimer (1994), which uses administrative data through 1988 and the
1991 Trustees Report assumptions.42 Figure 2 presents estimates of IRRs by
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Figure 2. Estimated real internal rates of return on social security contribmions. Source: Derived from Leimer (1994).
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cohort from this study. Consistent with popular discussion ofsocial security,
Leimer's results indicate that early cohorts received very high IRR~- real
returns per annurn ofalmost 40 percent Later birth cohorts fare worse, wi th
IRR figures predicted to remain below 2 percent in real terms into the
foreseeable future.
Comparable estimates produced by the Office of the Actuary are shown in
Figure 3, based on the hypothetical worker approach described above. We
present a "composite worker" estimate equal to a weighted average of a
range of worker types (e.g., varying by sex, marital status, age-earnings pro-
file).4'! Under the present law simulation, the internal rate of return will fall
from 5 percent for the 1920 cohort to 2.5 percent for workers born in the
1960s; thereafter it remains around 2.5 percent Under the Holdben ap-
proach, returns are roughly similar for cohorts until 1970; thereafter ta.x
increases required to maintain benefit promises drive down the IRR to
below 2 percent Under the Holdtax profile, returns fall below 2 percent
sooner, for the group born in the late 1950s. In other words, under either
solvency scenario, members of the baby boom generation will be the first
generation in the history ofsocial security to receive rates of return on their
taxes significantly below the market rate of return. This result is what gives
rise to comments such as those quoted as the outset ofthis chapter.
In Table 5 we compare the IRR paths derived using Leimer's "actual" data
with those using the SSA "composite worker" data. It is interesting to note
that the IRR estimates tell substantially the same story regarding trend over
time: IRRs are projected to be much lower for future cohorts than for past
workers44 Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two
projections, in that the returns projected by the Office of the Actuary ex-
ceed Leimer's for the baby boom generations forward; and the magnitude
of the difference is substantial, on the order of20 to 30 percent The differ-
ences are probably due to the fact that Leimer's estimates are based on 1991
rather than on 1997 figures and use actual rather than hypothetical worker
data.
We next present NPV estimates for the benchmark case. Figure 4 illus-
trates the results using (our modification of) Leimer's estimates, where we
focus only on the Holdben scenario. The first series in the figure (left scale)
presents the NPV of social security for each birth cohort converted from
1989 to 1997 dollars using the appropriate interest factors. (Compara-
ble numbers based on our stylized model appear in the third column of
Table 1.) The figure clearly demonstrates that the social security system has
redistributed wealth substantially toward earlier birth cohorts. This is consis-
tent with the stylized model, which showed that in the start-up phase of an
unfunded defined benefit pension plan the initial elderly receive retire-
ment benefits above what they paid into the system. More surprising to
many will be the size and persistence of the wealth transfers under social
security over time. That is, based on these computations, it appears that the
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Figure 3. Social security IRR, Benchmarks: Present Law, Holdben, Holdtax for composite worker. Source: Un-
published data supplied by the SSA Office of the Actuary.
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TABLE 5. Internal Rates of Return (IRR) Estimates Using Alternative Methods
Bi,·th Year
1920
1930
1937
1943
J949
J955
1964
1973
1985
1997
2004
IRR l-ei7ller
(1994) Holt.iben
Type Plan
5.68
3.95
3.20
2.33
2.17
2.04
1.80
1.76
1.72
1.51
1.45
IRR
Advisary Council
(l99i) Holdben
Type Plan
4.97
3.59
3.02
2.64
2.55
2.49
2.35
2.27
2.08
1.85
1.73
Percentage
Difference
-J3
-9
-6
J3
J8
22
31
29
21
23
19
Sources: Col. 2 from Leimer (1994); Col. 3 = Composite worker estimate derived by authors
from data provided by the SSA Office of the Actuary; Col. 4 = (Col 3 - Col 2) /Col 2.
U.S. social security system continued to deliver positive and substantial net
benefits well after the first generation of retirees aged out of the program.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the social security subsidy was granted to
more than 50 birth cohorts, with NPVs turning negative only for cohorts
born after 1937.
The second series (right scale) in Figure 4 represents the cumulative sum
of the first series, that is, the sum across all birth cohorts prior to the indi-
cated year of the NPVs. This corresponds to column 4 in our stylized exam-
ple. This cumulative net transfer reaches its maximum in 1937 at approx-
imately $9.7 trillion in present value ($1997). It is of interest to note that this
$9.7 trillion figure is in the same ballpark as the cumulative net present
value of$12 trillion for 1937 generated in om stylized example in Table 1.
By 1977 Leimer's accumulated NPV fell to $7.2 trillion, while our stylized
number fell to $8.2 trillion. In general, we should expect Leimer's numbers
to be a bit smaller than ours, because the economy actually grew faster than
1.2 percent between 1938 and 1997. This is partly offset by the fact that
generations born between 1908 and 1937 in fact continued to receive sub-
sidies from social security, whereas in om stylized example, they did not.
These results are combined with other estimates of social secmity un-
funded liabilities from Goss (this volume) in Table 6 to approximate the net
transfers already paid and to be paid by different sets of cohorts, in a way
directly comparable to Table 3. Here we see that the system's cumulative net
subsidy to date, counting all those living and working today, stands at about
$7.2 trillion (last column, third row). This figme is in the same range as our
stylized model's $8.2 trillion valuation. Future benefits already accrued
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Figure 4. Social security net intercohort transfers. Source: Leimer (1994) tax increase balanced budget scenario
and authors' calculations. All figures are present values as of 1997.
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TABLE 6. Social Security Present Values by Birth Year: U.S. Svstem
PVoJPtl.'1 IPVojFulu re PVoJFuture
Benefit< I Benefit> Benefiu to be
Received I.l'S5 Already .1ccrued le.l.,
PVofPa.l1 I Accrued Future
Contributions Based on Past Contributions Row Cumulative
Birth Year AI(" ill 1997 Made Contributions to be Made Total Jolat
1859-1917 80+ (dead) 7.9" [OJ" 0 7.ey 7.9
1918-1937 60-79 (living [01" 1.8' 9.7
and retired)
-H.5" 9.5
1938-1977 20-59 (living -1.7(' -2.5:\ 7.2
and working)
1978+ :519 (not yet 0 0 -7.2 -7.2" 0
working or not
yet born)
Total -0.6" 951>·, -8.9' 0
:'\OlCS: ' Derived from Leimer (1994)
I> Derived from Goss (1998)
, Derived from Trustees Report (1998) (accumulated trust fund)
d Derived from authors' assumptions
r Derived from the above and economic theory
based on past contributions are $9.5 trillion. [fwe subtract the current value
of the trust fund of about $0.6 trillion, we arrive at the estimate of the
unfunded liability of $8.9 trillion, close to what we found in our stylized
model. This can be divided into two pieces. The transfer still to be paid by
current workers (based on future contributions and the corresponding ben-
efit to be accrued) is about $1.7 trillion, while the burden "owed" by future
cohorts not yet working or not yet born is on the order of$7.2 trillion.
Next we illustrate the other money's worth estimates, under the alterna-
tive benchmark scenarios. Advisory Council estimates of the path of the net
subsidy are given in Figure 5, and the PVB/PVT ratio in Figure 6. The
patterns depicted indicate that both the net subsidy and the benefit to tax
ratio would be projected to rise given present law (PL) but these paths are
not feasible since the current system is unsustainable. More realistic projec-
tions under the Holdben and Holdtax scenarios indicate that the net sub-
sidy would remain substantially negative, and the benefit-to-tax ratio would
remain well below 100 percent, into the foreseeable future. There are also
interesting distributional differences across the benchmark scenarios: thus
the negative net subsidy is more similar across cohorts under the Holdtax
plan, while as-yet-unborn cohorts pay more over their lifetimes in the Hold-
ben approach.
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Money's worth estimates for more fundamental nforln options. Next, we com-
pare the money's worth statistics for the three Advisory Council plans de-
scribed in Chapter I of this volume, along with the Holdben and Holdtax
benchmarks. [n this case, we present the Advisory Council estimates for the
"Maintain Benefits" (MB) approach, which attempts to keep benefit prom-
ises more or less fixed by raising tax revenue to finance them; the "Individ-
ual Account" (1A) approach, which pares down government-paid benefits
somewhat and creates a small individually-owned government-managed de-
fined contribution account; and the "Personal Security Account" (PSA)
plan, which would cut benefits to a relatively low uniform per-worker pay-
ment, supplementing this \\~th a privately-managed defined contribution
plan like that of a 401 (k) pension.·-'
The IRR profiles associated with these options appear in Figure 7, where
both Holdben and Holdtax profiles end up \vith IRRs under 2 percent in
the long run. The Advisory Council reform plans all have projected IRRs
greater than Holdtax IRRs for all cohorts depicted, and they exceed Hold-
ben IRRs for birth cohorts after 1973. Comparing the three reform pro-
posals, the PSA plan's return is projected to be highest, followed by MB plan
returns, and then IA plan returns for birth groups after about 1960.41>
Net social security subsidy patterns appear in Figure 8, where once again
the PSA plan dominates the others for cohorts born after the mid-1960s.
Figure 9 provides the money's worth ratio (PVB/PVT) patterns by reform
plan. The benefit-to-tax ratio for the PSA plan dominates those of the other
two reform plans for virtually all birth cohorts, and rises above 100 percent
for cohorts after about 1970. Thus it is understandable how one could
conclude that each of these three plans - and probably the PSA plan in
particular - would be preferable for most cohorts relative to Holdben or
Holdtax. Below we show that this conclusion is not generally warranted.
Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Moneys Worth
Measures: When Is a Single Statistic Sufficient?
Having seen how social security money's worth is computed in practice, we
turn next to describing the conditions under which a single statistic accu-
rately reflects the costs and benefits of different social security programs.
Not surprisingly, the main difficulty is that the future cannot be perfectly
predicted. One approach, favored by the Advisory Council (1997), is to
replace the vast multiplicity of possible future worlds with a single average
scenario in which all cash flows are discounted at the riskless rate of interest.
The trouble with this approach is that households might strongly prefer the
average outcome for sure rather than the distribution of possible outcomes;
that is, people might be willing to pay much more for the certain plan than
for the uncertain plan, yet the Ad\~soryCouncil approach would assign both
plans the same money's worth. Money's worth measures that ignore the
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disutility of risk are then biased in favor of uncertain plans that offer high
average outcomes.
The underlying point is that money's worth measures should reflect
choice and welfare. That is, it would be undesirable to assign a higher
money's worth to one plan over a second, when we knew the first plan would
reduce the welfare ofall participants as compared to the second. In the most
general situation, then, accurate money's worth numbers require a detailed
knowledge of all households' preferences, including their attitudes toward
risk. Since these preferences are not generally known, it might seem hope-
less to derive a useful set of summary statistics that can be used for compar-
ing different social security systems.
There is, however, a set of special conditions under which precise money's
worth numbers can be obtained without knowledge of individual prefer-
ences. This scenario serves as our benchmark case in the analysis below. We
show that under such conditions, the type of money's worth measures of-
fered by groups such as the Advisory Council are biased whenever there is
any genuine uncertainty about outcomes, and the bias is usually in favor of
privatization. In actuality, of course, none of these special conditions is
satisfied precisely, so we then consider how one might adjust money's worth
estimates to account for deviations from the theoretical case. This adjust-
ment moves some components of the theoretically sound money's worth
calculations in the direction of the Advisory Council numbers, but other
components move in the opposite direction. In any case, a substantial bias in
the non-risk adjusted approach remains.
Simple Moneys Worth Measures Require Four Conditions
Four conditions must hold for the risk-adjusted net present value money's
worth measure to correctly compare the welfare effects of different social
security regimes. These four conditions pertain to optimization, inter-
generational tradeoffs, price stability, and spanning. If all are satisfied, and
all relevant cash flows are included, then the net present value measure
extended to the uncertainty case (via the risk-adjusted probabilities or risk-
adjusted discount rates) accurately summarizes the costs and benefits of
different social security regimes. The four conditions together are sufficient
(as well as necessary) to insure that a higher NPV guarantees higher welfare,
no matter what the form of the household utility functions. 47 When one or
more of these conditions fails, an accurate money's worth calculation re-
quires specific knowledge of individual preference orderings. In this case,
we say that a utility-independent money's worth does not exist, or for short,
that simple money's worth measures are not valid.
Inconsistent optimization and forced savings. The first condition that must
hold for money's worth measures to be valid is that households must be
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consistent optimizers. In other words, people must understand the invest-
ment opportunities available to them, which in turn should be defined by
market prices and taxes, and they must be "foresightful". For example, if
consumers immediately spent every dollar of income they received, then
the timing of taxes and benefits would be crucial to welfare, and no single
number could possibly summarize a lifetime stream of taxes and benefits
(without explicit knowledge of peoples' utility functions).
Experts long have argued that a primary rationale for social security (and
the reason the current system has survived so long) is that many households
left to their own devices would undersave and then, when old, either live in
poverty OJ" throw themselves on the mercy of the rest of society.4s Thus the
raison d'etre of social security contradicts the first necessary condition for
the validity of money's worth. By taxing individuals when they are young and
employed, and paying them when they are old and retired, social security in
effect is a forced savings plan (assuming that workers cannot undo every-
thing by borrowing when young against their future social security income).
But standard money's worth measures miss completely the benefits of this
forced saving aspect of social security. Indeed, if the rate of return on the
social security taxes \"ere equal to the riskless real interest rate, then none of
the money's worth measures would discern any difference between social
security plans of different sizes; no social security at all would rank on a par
with the social security system currently in place.'"
As it happens, most reform plans, including all those proposed by the
Advisory Council, maintain approximately the same amount of forced sav-
ing - that is, they differ more over what is to be done with the taxes than in
how high they should be. The next three conditions, therefore, are likely to
have a larger impact on the accuracy of money's worth measures in the
present context.
fntergenerational and intragenerational tradeofJs. The second necessary con-
dition for money's worth to be accurate when comparing different social
security regimes is that the relative ranking of the plans should not differ
across households. For example, one social security program might be less
generous to the current old, but more generous to future generations. In
this event, money's worth numbers would be informative because they
would reveal the intergenerational tradeoffs, but they would not in them-
selves suggest which was the better plan across all households.
Similarly, a key motive for the current social security program is in-
tragenerational redistribution - transferring consumption from wealthier
members of a cohort to less well-off ones. Comparing the current program
to say a privatized system that has less redistribution would give money's
worth rankings that differ across types of individuals. In general, there are
likely to be benefits and costs to society from redistributive policies that are
not captured by money's worth measures (Myers 1996).'0
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Stable prices (and stable shadow prices). A third necessary condition that must
be satisfied in order for money's worth numbers to reflect welfare unam-
biguously is that prices should not change across regimes. Below we discuss
the importance of modeling the general equilibrium impact of a massive
social security structural change. Here we simply point out that, if a new
foocial security regime were to change real interest rates, then discounting
the cash flows at the old interest rates would give a biased assessment of
household opportunities. If changes in social security taxes change the
shadow price on leisure, then measuring money's worth with the old after-
tax wages would also give a distorted picture. We also note that changes in
the social security tax rates or benefit rules may change relative incomes,
and since households are heterogeneous, this in turn may change demand
for various goods and assets, which in turn might change many prices. Once
prices change across regimes, it is impossible to rigorously rank alternative
regimes by a one-dimensional statistic like money's worth.
Spanning. The fourth necessary condition for the validity of money's
worth calculations is that households must be able to duplicate all social
security income streams (including benefits and taxes) using cash flows of
securities that can be marketed and traded by all households. This condi-
tion is usually called "spanning." When spanning obtains, it is appropriate
to represent each income stream with its market value, that is, by the price of
the marketed security (or combination of securities) giving the identical
cash flow. The reason, of course, is that a household decision-maker who
had the money instead of the income stream could purchase the same cash
flow; conversely, with the income stream, he or she could sell the cash flow
and get the money. A gift of either the income stream or its market price
would, in the end, yield the person the same utility assuming that he or she
optimized the rest of the portfolio after receiving the gift. When such an
income stream is small, its market price is the correct measure of its money's
worth, even if the person does not reoptimize after receiving the stream.
The reason is that by optimizing his portfolio before being given the income
stream, the consumer will have chosen to hold enough similar income
streams so that the marginal utility of the new income stream is equal to the
marginal utility of its market price.
In a world with no uncertainty, with households that are foward-looking
and that can borrow and lend at some common riskless rate of interest, all
income streams are in effect marketed. But in a world with uncertain payoffs
and incomplete markets, there may be no market price to attach to a future
stream of contingent cash flows. Also many households may not have access
to all capital markets, even if they exist. In this event, and in the absence of
detailed knowledge of individual utility preferences, no money's worth sta-
tistic can accurately summarize the welfare benefit of the social security
income streams. Below we offer ways to guess what the money's worth of
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social security might be when spanning fails, provided that households have
special kinds of preferences.
Let us next consider the situation where a payment stream is marketed
but we cannot directly observe its market price. This frequently occurs when
an income stream is a complicated linear combination ofmarketed streams,
but is not directly marketed itself. (This situation also arises when we try to
forecast the future. We know, for example, that in five years stocks and
bonds will both be marketed, but we do not now know what those market
prices will be.) One can ascertain what the market price would have to be by
applying the principle of "no arbitrage": that is, ifone stream of paymen ts is
a linear combination ofother streams, then its price must be the same linear
combination of the other market prices. To implement this scheme we
would have to find the right linear combination of marketed securities to
J'eproduce the cash flow of the stream in question, an exercise that is often
quite time-consuming. The so-called arbitrage pricing theorem assures us
that there is always a direct way, which we now describe, of computing the
market price without explicitly finding the spanning securities.
When a marketed income stream is perfectly predictable (it can fluctuate
over time, but in a way that leaves no room for surprises), then its market
price can be obtained by discounting each of its cash flows by the riskless
rate of interest for the corresponding maturity. When the cash flow is
stochastic but still marketed, the market price can still be recovered, but
only through a much more complicated calculation that takes into account
the extra risk. This is a multi-step process: one must forecast first the collec-
tion of possible cash flow paths, and the probability of each; one must also
forecast the collection of possible short interest rate paths, and the proba-
bility ofeach. Additionally one must estimate the joint probabilities of inter-
est rate paths and cash flow paths. (The security will be worth less if its high
cash flows only occur on paths that also exhibit high interest rates.) Finally,
one must also forecast the joint probabilities of the interest rate cash flow
paths and economy-wide aggregate consumption. (Cash flows that are high
only along paths in which the economy as a whole is rich, effectively pay only
when people do not need the money, and they should therefore be worth
less.) In the end, money's worth values will depend on the expected cash
flows discounted at the riskless rate, and (negatively) on some measure of
the covariance of the cash flows with a benchmark measure of aggregate
consumption.51
This complicated series of estimates and calculations is sometimes re-
ferred to as "discounting the expected cash flows at the risk-adjusted interest
rate," or the "risk-adjusted net present value." The final result is likely to be
quite different from discounting expected cash flows at the riskless rate of
interest. In practice, the full-bodied calculation is very difficult to do cor-
rectly, although Wall Street research has applied this methodology to spe-
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cific security cash flows. The non-risk-adjusted approach, namely discount-
ing expected cash flows using the riskless interest rate, is only appropriate if
the cash flows are independent of both interest rates and aggregate con-
sumption. This point is frequently overlooked when policymakers value
social security cash flows.
Moneys Worth with Optimization, Generational Homogeneity,
Stable Prices, and Spanning
Under the maintained hypotheses of optimization, generational homoge-
neity, stable prices, and spanning, the correct money's worth measure ofany
social security plan for any individual is the risk-adjusted net present value,
calculated as the market value of his or her stream of benefits minus the
market value of the stream of contributions. More precisely, suppose the
market value of benefits less taxes is higher for every generation under one
social security system than it is under a different social security system. Then
(assuming optimization, stable prices, and spanning), the welfare of every
generation must be higher in the first system than in the second, no matter
what the preferences of the households regarding consumption, impa-
tience, or attitudes toward risk. The proof of this assertion is immediate.
Since prices are the same across the two plans (stable prices), and since
individuals properly exploit their opportunities (optimization), and since
the first plan offers each individual more opportunities than the second
plan (spanning plus higher market values), the comparison does not de-
pend on preferences.
Though the assertion is straightforward, its implications are often missed.
We shall apply our analysis to the current reform debate below, but here we
list three implications. Subsequently we explore the meaning of money's
worth if the spanning and stable prices hypotheses fail.
Stock market money s worth. The stock market is a marketed collection of
assets, just as are bond markets. One approach to social security reform
involves replacing the trust fund's bond holdings with stock holdings; other
reforms involve privatization, where individuals are permitted to invest di-
rectly in the capital market. It is tempting to presume that the substitution of
stocks for bonds would dramatically improve the money's worth of social
security, since the stock market has historically earned a much higher rate of
return than government bonds. We have just seen, however, that, under the
assumptions stated above, marketed income streams such as stock market
returns should be assigned a money's worth equal to their market prices. A
dollar's worth of stocks can be worth no more than a dollar's worth of bonds,
and so a switch between bonds and stocks should not alter money's worth,
correctly calculated.
This conclusion might seem odd, given that the arithmetic average an-
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nual real total return from 1926 to 1996 was 9.4 percent on the S&P 500
stock index, while it was only 2.3 percent on intermediate term government
bonds (Ibbotson and Associates 1997). But to understand the conclusion it
is necessary to ask what drove the historical pattern of returns and whether
it is reasonable to expect the past to characterize the distribution of future
returns!,2 Three possible explanations of the past returns immediately
come to mind, two of which suggest the future might well be like the past.
None of these explanations contradict~ the view that a dollar of stocks
should have the same money's worth as a dollar of bonds.
One explanation is that stocks are riskier than bonds; that is, stocks histor-
ically have a much higher standard deviation of return than bonds. And
more important, stock market returns are correlated with aggregate con-
sumption - the stock market pays off mostjust when people are the wealthi-
est and need the money the least. The higher expected returns are neces-
sary to compensate investors for the higher risk, as we have seen in the pa~t
and may continue to see in the future.
Some have argued, however, that the higher risk is not sufficient to ex-
plain the high historical returns- this is the so-called "equity premium
puzzle" (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Others have argued that over a suffi-
ciently long time horizon stocks are actually less risky than Treasury bonds
or bills. For example, there are no 22-year periods since 1926 in the U.S. in
which stocks did not outperform bonds."' This suggests another explana-
tion for the high return on equities: many people may be irrationally afraid
of holding stocks. Yet another possibility is that the performance of the U.S.
stock market has been uniquely favorable; that is, the U.S. received a par-
ticularly good realization of history that we should not expect to be re-
peated. Using data gathered from all stock markets in existence around the
world since 1900, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995) show that stocks on
average just barely outperformed bonds.
Our conclusion that a dollar of stock and a dollar of bonds should have
the same money's worth holds regardless of the explanation, provided our
four assumptions are maintained. For example, if households are irra-
tionally afraid of holding stocks, it might seem to follow that the social
security system should not fall prey to these irrational fears, and therefore it
ought to encourage or force additional investment in the stock market. But
under the assumptions of optimization and spanning this will not help. That
is, households who are irrationally afraid of stocks will probably avoid equi.
ties if offered choice in individual account~, for the same reason they hold
too few stocks in the remainder of their portfolios. If they were in turn
mandated to hold some nonzero amount of equities, they will be aware that
their social security money is now subject to stock market risk, and they will
compensate by holding fewer stocks in their own portfolios (or even by
selling stocks short) ."4 In other words, the same anxiety that causes an inves-
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tor to value a dollar of stocks equal to a dollar of bonds ought also to be
recognized by the social security participant if part of social security is in-
vested in equity.
What about a future move into stocks? In order to calculate the money's
worth for future generations of holding stock in social security, we require-
but of course do not know - future stock prices. Therefore it is understand-
able that analysts seek to forecast stock payoffs and then back out the
money's worth of holding stock in the future. But a rigorous application of
money's worth would still have to assign a future dollar's worth of stocks the
same value as a future dollar of bonds.
Risky benefits and contributions. Since current benefi ts under our pay-as-you-
go system actually depend on the gross domestic product (GOP), that in
turn is correlated with the stock market, similar reasoning suggests that we
should regard current social secUl;ty benefits as risky and discount them at a
higher risk-adjusted rate. Tax revenues, too, depend on GOP and are proba-
bly correlated positively with stock returns, so we should regard these cash
flows as risky under the current social security program and discount them
using a risk-adjusted rate as well. It is likely that the appropriate rates for
discounting taxes and benefits will differ.
Privatizing may not matter. Suppose the current social security program
were replaced by a system of individual accounts. Suppose also that taxes
were raised in order to payoff the current unfunded liabilities. As argued in
the first section of this chapter, in a world of certainty, these taxes can be
raised so that the market value of the taxes on each household is exactly
equal to the market value of the old social security plan. The same logic can
be extended to the case of uncertainty. It follows that that if there is optimi-
zation, stable prices, and spanning, then no household money's worth will
change, and welfare will be unaffected.
Choosing Between the Moneys Worth Measures
In keeping with the Advisory Council's usage, we have presented three
different money's worth measures- the internal real rate of return, the
benefit-to-tax ratio, and the net present value metric. There remains the
question of which of these money's worth measures is most useful, and for
what purpose.
The IRR and PVB/PVT have the advantages that they are unit-free and
easy to understand. They facilitate comparisons between different birth
cohorts inside the same social security plan.55 However, these measures can
lead to incorrect conclusions when comparing systems of differen t scale.
The shortcomings of the IRR and PVB/PVT measures can be illustrated
as follows. Consider a social security system in which taxes are the sum of
one component (TA ) representing the portion of the social secUl;ty tax
invested at the riskless market interest rate and returned to the worker as
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benefits later in life, and a second component (7~) representing the interest
that must be paid on government bonds given to the old at the system's
inception and rolled over into the indefinite future, interest that never
reverts back to the worker. As we have seen, our current social security
system resembles this hypothetical situation. All three measures of money's
worth will reflect the fact that every cohort after the start-up ones gets a "bad
deal" compared to no social security system at all.
Now let us compare our hypothetical system to another one in which TA is
increased. If all households are rational and able to participate fully in
capital market transactions, the size of the social security taxes that earn the
riskless return would be completely irrelevant. That is, households will sim-
ply undo in their own private portfolios whatever the social security system
forces them to invest. This truth is revealed by the NPV measure of money's
worth, but is confused by both IRR and PVB/ PVT. Consider first the NPV:
NPV = PVB - (TA+ T,) = [1~(1+r)]/ (1+r) - (TA+ T,) = -T,.
Increasing the portion TA of social security that reflects a riskless return on
taxes collected has no effect on NPY. On the other hand, if we measured
money's worth by the PVB/PVT method we would get:
PVB/PVT = PVB/(TA+ 1;) = 7~/(TA + T,)
and this number increases (converging to 1) as the program is expanded
and TA is increased (to infinity). Similarly, it can be shown that increasing TA
will raise the IRR, because the IRR is a weighted average of the return on TA
and the return on T,.
The general point is that any reform plan that increases the size of social
security through an increase in the funded part will show an improvement
in the PVB/PVT and IRR, even though the correct measure, NPV, will show
no change. In other words, part of the apparent superiority of these reform
plans over the pay-as-you-go benchmark is based on the misleading advan-
tage that comes with greater scale when the wrong measure of money's
worth is used to compare plans.
Overall, our view is that the risk-adjusted NPV measure is most helpful for
ranking alternative social security plans. In a world with spanning and op-
timization, this measure corresponds precisely to market price and is there-
fore the correct money's worth statistic. The same cannot be said for IRR
orPVB/PVT.
Moneys Worth When Spanning Fails
Though money's worth measures are informative given the four theoretical
conditions just described, we recognize that none of these conditions is
likely to be perfectly satisfied in the real world. As described above, in a
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world with uncertain payoffs and incomplete markets, there may be no
market price to attach to a future stream of contingent cash flows. For
example, even under the current pay-as-you-go system, benefits are con-
tingent on a valiety of economic factors and not easily reproduced via a
portfolio of marketed securities. In practice, benefits vary with aggregate
shocks like demographic changes; as we have seen in the past, the larger the
pool of young workers, the higher tend to be the benefits to old workers.
Benefits also tend to depend on productivity changes (i.e., the higher the
average wage ofyoung workers, the higher the benefits to old workers), and,
most important, they depend on policy changes. It is difficult to find a
marketed security that pays off precisely when Congress decides to change
social security benefit rules. Additionally, retiree benefits also depend on
idiosyncratic shocks to earnings, length oflife, and disability. Once again, it
is hard to find a marketed security that pays off precisely when a particular
household has a few bad earnings years.
The stock market and limited pm·ticipation. More than half of all U.S. house-
holds invest no money in the stock market, either directly or indirectly. This
strongly suggests that the spanning hypothesis - that every household can
freely trade every asset- is violated. If so, "constrained" households might
be helped by a policy that increased their stockownership levels. The ques-
tion is, how does this change the way that money's worth calculations should
be done?
Consider a "constrained" household that holds no stock because it faces a
fixed cost of learning about the stock market or because it has no wealth
outside of social security. Suppose the household's income is independent
ofstock market returns. Then the correct money's worth from a small incre-
mental holding ofstock can be obtained by discounting the expected payoff
of the stock at the risk-free rate.Sfi That is, the appropriate money's worth
for constrained households from small equity investments is the non-risk-
adjusted money's worth. The reason is that the first few dollars ofstock bring
negligible risk, and therefore increase utility proportional to their expected
payoff, with no risk adjustment.
In our view, the fundamental rationale for social security investmem in
the stock market rests on the existence of people who are currently con-
strained from holding equities. It is interesting to note that those who would
benefit the most from social security investments in equity are probably the
poor, since this group is least likely to hold stocks now.
QuantifYing the money's worth to a constrained household of a large
movement into the stock market is more difficult. It is clear, however, that a
discount rate higher than the risk-free rate should be used in computing the
money's worth of the stock payoffs.m The reason is that, as households gain
more exposure to stocks, they would perceive their old age income as more
and more at risk.
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Suppose the trust fund invests in the stock market, and pays out benefits
that depend correspondingly on the return from its stock market invest-
ments. QuantifYing money's worth as a whole of these trust fund invest-
ments in the stock market depends on a host ofquestions. For example, how
many of the households that do not currently hold stock are constrained,
and how many of them chose not to hold stocks? For those that are con-
strained, how much stock would they have held, were they not constrained?
In other words, how risk averse are they, and how independent is their
income of stock returns? Finally, how big is the stock market invesunent?
Below, we offer quantitative answers to these questions. For now, we sum-
marize by saying that in the presence of constrained households, a shift of
one dollar of social security trust fund invesunents from bonds into stocks
should raise social security money's worth, correctly calculated (even
though it does not change market value), but by much less than the non-
risk-adjusted money's worth would suggest.
Accountingfor idiosyncratic risk. There are several reasons that the non-risk
adjusted approach to money's worth estimates for the current social security
system are too low, arising from the failure of the spanning assumption
described above. Such failures arise because many of the risks that house-
holds face - uncertainty about earnings, length oflife, disability, and health
expenses - may not be fully insurable or hedgeable in private markets.
These events are not perfectly insurable due to moral hazard and adverse
selection. While the government cannot overcome moral hazard, it can
overcome adverse selection by making participation mandatory; indeed,
this is one of the rationales for mandatory national social security systems.5H
To the extent that social security provides insurance with no private sub-
stitute or an imperfect private substitute, it is inappropriate to discount the
expected benefits at a risk-free rate.59 That is, the benefit flows of the cur-
rent social security system are negatively correlated witll individual income,
and hence the discount rate should be sm.aller than the riskless rate. The
non-risk-adjusted approach to money's worth calculations therefore tends
to understate the benefits of social security because it calculates benefits at
actuarial probabilities, neglecting the insurance premium that participants
would be willing to pay beyond those expected benefits to receive the social
security stream of benefits.
As an example of this problem, consider longevity risk. Under a manda-
tory national social security system, longevity risk is pooled since social
security benefits are annuitized, paying benefits irrespective ofhow long the
retiree lives. If the private markets could nOl provide annuities at all, house-
holds would be exposed to the risk of living too long (and outliving their
resources). They would likely hedge against this by saving more; that is, they
would be forced to give up resources when they are younger. They would be
made worse off by this loss of government-mandated insurance.5O If the
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private markets did provide annuitization, but less efficiently due to adverse
selection, households would again be worse off in an ex-ante sense.'lI
Accounting for intergenerational aggregate risk. Social security's contingent
benefit and tax streams share risk across generations. The most important
way the current system does so is by making retiree benefits for one genera-
tion depend explicitly on the wage bill of the next generation; this creates a
type of earnings insurance for the young of one generation paid for by the
old of the previous generation. It is hard to imagine even a fledgling private
market arising to displace this type of intergenerational risk-sharing since
the young and the old are never young at the same time, when they might
perceive the advantage of entering into a generational contract. Reforms
that rely heavily on individual stock market accounts would no doubt reduce
the level of intergenerational insurance, a fact overlooked by standard
money's worth calculations.52
To pursue this idea further, one might imagine restructuring social se-
curity benefit and tax formulas in order to provide better old-age consump-
tion insurance by making both depend inversely on the past few decades of
stock market performance. This recognizes that a generation blessed with
remarkable stock market returns (such as the current baby boomer cohort)
might not require as much compensation when it is old, because it would
be able to accumulate more than the average generation. Such a genera-
tion would then receive lower government-supplied benefits, in turn reduc-
ing the taxes paid by the next generation's young. Conversely, a generation
experiencing abnormally low stock returns (e.g., the Great Depression)
would receive higher benefits, financed by raising taxes on the next gen-
eration. Depending on how sharp are the tax changes, the burden of
poor stock market performance could be shared by several succeeding
generations.
This type of intergenerational risk pooling could be implemented more
directly by leaving the benefit formula unchanged but instead investing part
of the social security trust fund in the stock market. Taxes on the next
generation to pay the benefits would be raised or lowered depending on the
performance of the equity market. If the trust fund held stock, then uncon-
strained households would, in equilibrium, hold correspondingly less, and
so their risk exposure would be reduced as in the above insurance scheme.5'
In effect, the stock is transferred to the next generation because its taxes
would rise precisely when the market performed poorly (Smelters, this vol-
ume; Bohn 1998; Diamond 1997). This scenario implies that the money's
worth of a social security defined-benefit system coupled with trust fund
investment in the stock market should be higher than a mechanical com-
putation obtained by discounting trust fund stock returns at a risky rate.
A more general point can be made as follows. The stocks of any genera-
tion are assets to which neither constrained households living at that time,
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nor future generations (constrained or not), have access. Social security
reforms that effectively take stock out of the hands of today's unconstrained
households, and transfer their returns to today's constrained households
and to tomorrow's households, do not change the market value of the sys-
tem. But they can very well improve risk-bearing in a world in which span-
ning fails, and therefore improve welfare. Both non-risk-adjusted money's
worth and market based, risk-adjusted NPV miss this beneficial result.64
General Equilibrium Effects and Moneys Worth
Almost any social security reform is likely to alter relative prices in the
economy. For example, if a significant amount of money were transferred
from bonds to stocks by the social security system, and if not all individuals
could fully offset these changes in their own portfolios, then stock prices
could be expected to rise and bond prices to fall. Consequently the return
on bonds would be expected to rise and the retum on stocks would fall. This
implies that the historical spread between stocks and bonds, so key to the
alleged advantage ofsocial security investment in stocks, would diminish.
The beneficiaries of privatization would then be old stockholders who
would gain from the rise in stock prices but would not live long enough to be
hurt by the fall in subsequent retums. The losers would be future workers
with access to the stock market who would then earn lower returns on their
stock investments. The menu of investments undertaken by the economy
would also probably change, moving to more adventurous risky projects,
since the old stocks would now be effectively spread out over more people
(including some of the previously constrained households). These sub-
tleties are missed by market-driven money's worth, and by non-risk-adjusted
money's worth measures.
Changes in social security may also produce changes in lifetime wealth
and effective tax rates on labor. Workers may respond by changing their
labor supply, which in tum might alter equilibrium wages. All these direct
and indirect effects of social security reform are missed by standard money's
worth measures. Under the current social security system, taxes paid while
young do not directly translate into benefits received while old. As we have
seen, for the typical workers, each payroll tax dollar raises tlle present value
of expected future benefits by less than a dollar (e.g., only 71 cents), and
therefore alters hours and retirement age decisions.65
Suppose social security taxes were increased to improve funding of the
system, and the revenues were not reflected in higher retirement benefits
for current workers but rather were used to reduce the transfers paid by
future generations. This would likely increase the distortion in the labor
supply decision of current workers, and, assuming substitution effects domi-
nate income effects, reduce labor supply. It would, however, reduce distol~
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tions faced by future workers, since they would receive a better return on
each dollar of social security contributions. In general, the effects of various
reform options on labor supply depend on how the transition burdens are
shared. Similarly, if the system's progressivity were altered by moving to
individual accounts, this would raise the net benefit per dollar of contribu-
tions for some groups and lower it for others, thus altering labor supply and
retirement incentives. ti6 None of these effects are captured by standard
money's worth estimates.
Money~Worth and the Current Reform Debate
In this section we examine two of the more prominent types of social se-
cl\l-ity reform proposals, in light of our critique of money's worth. The first
sort of plan we assess is usually referred to as (partial or full) privatization,
where the objective is to replace (part or all) of the current social security
system with a system of individual defined-contribution accounts. The sec-
ond type of proposal we evaluate is one which would maintain the defined-
benefit nature of the current social security system, but would change the
program's investment policy: part or all of the social secm-ity trust fund
would be held in equities. Our goal is to evaluate money's worth measures
in each case.
Moneys Worth of Individual Accounts
Perhaps the most prominent argument offered in favor of privatization is
that individual accounts would pay a higher rate of return than would the
curren t system. The recent Advisory Council report (1997) suggested that
moving toward a system of individual accoun ts would raise the rate of return
that participants receive under the social security program. Echoing Forbes
(1996) cited above, Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute argued for privat-
ization because "the system remains a bad deal for most Americans, a sit-
uation that is growing worse for today's young workers. Payroll taxes are
already so high that even if today's young workers receive the promised bene-
fits, such benefits will amount to a low, below-market return for those taxes.
Studies show that for most young workers such benefits would amount to a
real return of one percent or less on the required taxes. For many, the real
return would be zero or even negative. These workers can now get far higher
relUrns and benefits through private savings, investment, and insurance. "67
This justification of individual accounts flows from two premises. First,
proponents note that projected rates of return promised under the current
social security system are low, between I and 1.5 percent in real terms
(Board ofTrustees 1997). Second, if the past is a reliable guide to the future,
real returns anticipated on private investments are likely to be much higher
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even than riskless rates of return, which themselves are higher than 2 per-
cent. For example, real stock returns averaged 9.4 percent and real govern-
ment bond returns averaged 2.3 percent per year, over the 1926-1996 pe-
riod in the U.S. (Ibbotson and Associates 1997). Proponents then conclude
that if social security were privatized and people were allowed to invest
their contributions directly in U.S. capital markets, everyone would achieve
higher rates of return and be better off. The problem is that the two prem-
ises on which the argument rests are accurate, but as we shall show next, it is
not correct to make the subsequent leap to the policy prescription.
To understand why, we proceed in three steps. Our starting point con-
siders a simple case where social security is privatized with no additional
prefunding. In this first case, we assume that the future is known with cer-
tainty and the only available assets are riskless bonds. This sheds light on the
effect of moving to mandated individual accounts where these accounts can
be held only in riskless bonds. Next, we examine the changes arising from
prefunding, achieved by raising taxes on current workers, so as to decrease
the social security system's unfunded liability. Finally, we study the results
when we add uncertainty and allow individuals to shift assets in their individ-
ual accounts from riskless bonds into stocks.
Privatization withO'ut prefunding: the certainty case. A fundamen tal error of
the simple privatization argument is that it ignores the accrued benefits
earned for past contributions by current workers and retirees. If these are
paid in full without changing the degree of prefunding in the system, and if
the money is raised via taxes on private accounts invested only in bonds,
then the excess of market return above the current social security l'eturn
will be completely dissipated in the new taxes.
Suppose the old social security system were shut down and all new social
security taxes deposited into individual accounts earning the riskless market
rate of return. It is important to acknowledge that privatization could be
implemented with no additional prefunding. For example, if the old social
security system were shut down, the government could issue each former
participant "recognition" bonds equivalent to the present value of accrued
benefits under the old system (which they would then be required to hold in
an individual account until retirement). Since the government selects the
mix of new taxes and borrowing from which to pay the principal and inter-
est on these recognition bonds, it could choose to keep the explicit recog-
nition bond debt growing along exactly the same trajectory that the old
unfunded liability would have followed had tlle old system continued. Pre-
funding would then be the same, because the new recognition bond debt
would have precisely replaced the old unfunded liability.
For concreteness, let us assume an economy that is in a steady state of
growth g equal to 1.2 percent \vith a riskless rate of interest r equal to 2.3
percent. Then each individual (after the start-up generations) would look
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forward to a 1.2 percent return under the old pay-as-you-go social security
system, versus a 2.3 percent return if the same money were invested directly
in (riskless) bonds. While 2.3 percent may not seem much higher than 1.2
percent, the accumulated difference grows large over a long worklife. For
example, given constant real contributions for 40 years, and constant real
benefits paid out over 20 years so as to yield a rate of return of 1.2 percent,
the benefits would need to be raised by about 40.8 percent in order to
increase the rate of return to 2.3 percen t. Put another way, individuals who
had individual accounts earning the riskless market return could pay 29
percent (40.8/1.408) less each year into their individual accounts and still
receive the same retirement benefit as they would get from their social
security contributions.
But as we showed above, this apparent gain is illusory. If the government
were to shut down the old underfunded social security system and move to
individual accounts, funds would still need to be raised to cover accrued
social security liabilities. Suppose we use $9.9 trillion as our estimate of the
unfunded liability.fiR One method for covering these liabilities would be to
issue $9.9 trillion in recognition bond debt, and then to roll over just
enough interest and principal to keep this debt growing at the rate the
unfunded liability would have grown under the old system.
Computing the exact path of payments required to achieve this target
precisely is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we can derive a reasonable
approximation based on the steady state scenario discussed above. The
required extra taxes to keep the debt-ta-CDP ratio constant would clearly
need to be (1'- g) X (value of the bonds). With a real interest rate of 2.3
percent, a growth rate of 1.2 percent, and an unfunded liability of about
$9.9 trillion fully transformed into recognition bond debt, this would in-
volve taxes equal to $109 billion in the first year (= (2.3 percent - 1.2
percent) X $9.9 trillion) .69 Using the current OASDI benefits of about $375
billion, and ignoring the current operating surplus by assuming these are
equal to contributions,'" the required new taxes represent 29 percent of
annual payroll tax collections, or about 3.6 percent of payroll. Put another
way, the new tax required to cover payments on the new recognition bond
debt would equal 29 percent of all contributions to the new individual
accounts." This is equivalent to every generation (forever) paying a 29
percent commission or load on all funds invested in the individual accounts.
But this is the entire surplus from market returns. It is worth emphasizing
that, as long as 1'is greater than g, the conclusion still holds: all the extra
returns from investing in capital markets will be dissipated by these transi-
tion costs. It does not matter whether the difference between the return on
capital markets and the return on the existing social security system (1' - g)
equals 1.1 percent, 3 percent, or even 10 percent!
Many popular discussions of social security privatization ignore tllese
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transition costs entirely. For example Beach and Davis (1998) of the Heri-
tage Foundation state:
If Americans were allowed to direct their payroll taxes into safe investment accounts
similar to 40 I (k) plans, or even super-safe U.S. Treasury bills, they would accumulate
far more money in savings for their "etirement years than they are ever likely to
receive from Social Security. Had they placed that same amount of lifetime em-
ployee and employer tax contributions into conservative tax-<:leferred IRA-type
investments- such a' a mutual fund composed of 50 percent U.S. government Trea-
sury bills and 50 percent equities - they could expect a real rate of return of over 5
percent per year prior to the payment of taxes after retirement.
Some analysts are more circumspect. For example, the Advisory Council
made a concerted effort to include additional transition taxes in their
money's worth calculations. The PSA plan puts 5 percent of pay into work-
ers' individual accounts and imposes a 1.52 percent transition tax that lasts
until 2070. 72 This added tax is incorporated into the Advisory Council's
money's worth calculations (1977: 177).
Senator Moynihan has proposed to reform social security through partial
privatization. In his plan, workers from now on would be allowed to deposit
up to 2 percent of their payroll tax into an individually-managed account.73
The rest of the system would apparently function like a scaled down version
of the current social security system, except that all the current accrued
benefits would continue as liabilities of the new system. Because the current
social security system is running a surplus, for the next 10 or 15 years the
Moynihan plan has the effect of redirecting into individual accounts the
surplus that would have otherwise flowed into the social security trust fund.
Though workers will earn high market returns on the 2 percent that goes
into their individual accounts, the system will eventually be unable to main-
tain the same benefit formula appearing in the current social secUlity sys-
tem because the trust fund will be smaller. Though the rate of return on the
privatized piece will be above the current social security return, the rate
of return on the non-privatized piece will fall, leaving the total return
unaffected.
Privatization with increased prefunding. Issuing recognition bonds that grow
in value at the same rate as the unfunded liability would have grown under
the current system is only one of several ways to finance the transition
toward a privatized social security system. (Recall that in a steady state, the
current system's unfunded liability will grow at the same rate as CDP.) A
dramatic (and probably unpopular) alternative would be to finance the
transition cost with a one-time lump sum tax, levied on each current worker.
This would generate a tax bill of about $68,000 per worker ($9.9 trillion /
147 million workers). Another equally dramatic solution would be to de-
fault completely on all the accrued benefits, forcing current workers and
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retirees to shoulder the entire $9.9 trillion loss. Both these alternatives
reduce the debt of the social security system relative to what the unfunded
liability would have been, and thus in our terminology they constitute a shift
toward greater funding.
Many economists believe that reducing social security"s unfunded liability
would enhance national saving and output, and hence they support pre-
funding on its own merits.?4 But increasing the system's funding level would
not immediately raise the rate of return on social security. Indeed, the
$68,000 tax would reduce the return of today's workers, and defaulting on
the unfunded liabilities would reduce the return of today's retirees and
older workers. In general, cohorts that are required to pay higher transition
taxes would receive a lower rate of return (less than g), while later cohorts
would expect a higher return (eventually 1', if the debt were paid off en-
tirely). Feldstein and Samwick (1996, 1997) would require members of the
baby boom generation to pay higher taxes, so that their children and future
generations would benefit relatively more. Alternatively, the trust fund
could be increased by cutting benefits, helping future generations as in the
Feldstein-Samwick approach, but at the expense of current retirees instead
ofcurrent workers. Under a partially funded social security system (i.e., one
with a trust fund), the rate of return on social security would be a weighted
average ofg and r, where the weight on rdepends directly on the size of the
trust fund.?;
Privatization without prpfunding: incorporating uncertainty. Consider now a
privatized system with individual accounts and with recognition bonds re-
placing all the accrued benefits. Suppose there is also uncertainty in the
world, and that workers have the option of moving the money in their
individual accounts from riskless assets to risky securities, such as stocks,
which have higher expected returns.
It is clear from our analysis in the previous section that, if all households
have access to stock investments on their own (i.e., ifspanning and optimiza-
tion hold), then permitting equities in the individual accounts will have no
effect on anyone's wellbeing. In effect, the stocks that workers buy for their
individual social security accounts will be purchased from their own private
portfolios. Their overall portfolios will end up absolutely unchanged.?fi
The next question is what would be the effect of this switch from bonds
into stocks on money's worth measures. As described earlier, conventional
money's worth estimates are based on expected values ofcontributions and
payouts and do not incorporate any adjustment for risk: Inasmuch as mean
equity returns are higher than mean bond returns, this change in invest-
ment pattern would then raise the individual accounts' internal rate of
return as typically computed, as well as the NPV and the PVB/ PVT ratio.
As an example, consider switching $100 from bond into stocks for 30
years. Figuring out the "money's worth" of this change depends on how one
values the stock. Ofcourse, transferring $100 from bonds into $100 ofstocks
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does not change the market value of the position, nor does it change the
welfare of anybody in the system, assuming spanning and optimization. But
the conventional money's worth approach yields a very different answer.
The Advisory Council's methodology assumed that stocks would return an
annual 7 percent real rate and bonds would pay 2.3 percent. Someone who
invested $100 in stocks would see the money grow in expected value by 7
percent per year over 30 years, to $761. Discounting this amount to the
present using a 2.3 percent rate produces a net present value of $385 =
$100 X (1.07)'0/ (1.023)30. According to this calculation, $285 of value has
supposedly been created, that is, the estimated net present value of this
change is $285. But we would contend that a risk-adjusted discount rate
should be used to measure the true money's worth of stocks and, under
spanning, the appropriate lisk-adjusted rate is the expected return on
stocks, 7 percent. Naturally, using a 7 percent rate to discount future risky
cash flows earning 7 percent produces a present value equal to $100 =
$100 X (1.07) 30/ (1.07) 30 and a net present value ofzero.
In other words, money's worth calculations using an appropriate risky
discount rate deviate considerably from those found in the literature, since
all benefit payouts that depend on stock market returns must be discounted
by a higher rate than the Treasury risk-free rate." In general, a money's
worth measure that assumes high returns on stock but discounts by a risk-
free rate will overstate the benefit of social security diversification, and the
overstatement will be greater the more stock assumed held in the social
security accounts.
Policy analysts have not computed money's worth measures for individual
account plans correcting for risk in the manner we suggest. However a
useful set of equivalent calculations is available from the Office of the Actu-
ary for variants of the IA and the PSA plans. Specifically, these alternative
money's worth statistics assume that the rate of return earned on stocks
is equal to that on bonds (approximately 2.3 percent). All three of the
money's worth statistics (lRR, NPV, PVBjPVT) based on this approach are
well below those reported earlier, and, indeed, most of the money's worth
advantage for the IA and PSA plans relative to the Holdtax benchmark
disappears (Figures 10, 11, and 12).7H
A somewhat different analysis applies if spanning does not hold. As we
have argued elsewhere (Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 1998), some
households are probably unable to access the capital markets on their own.
Economic theory suggests that allowing some portion of the individual ac-
counts to be held in equities could well make these households better off.
This is because people whose income is uncorrelated with stock returns
should hold some stock in their portfolios, so as to benefit from the higher
expected returns stocks provide compared to safe assets. Such constrained
individuals would find that changing the first dollar from bonds to stocks
would raise returns with negligible added risk. Additional stock investments
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would raise returns further, but at the cost of additional risk, so that dsk-
adjusted returns would rise, but by less than non-adjusted returns. (Sooner
or later dsk-adjusted returns would actually fall. Determining the optimal
level of stock investment in the accounts depends on household wealth
levels and their risk tolerances.)
Additional research must evaluate how many people are constrained in
their private portfolios from holding stock, what types of people they are,
and how much they would benefit from investing part of their individual
accounts in equities under a privatized system. Some two-fifths of the U.S.
population held stock in 1995, either on their own account or in defined
contribution pensions or mutual funds (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and
Sunden 1997; Ameriks and Zeldes, in progress). Of the remaining three-
fifths, some are young and will perhaps accumulate stock later in life; halfof
the middle-aged population (44-54) held some stock in 1995. This is proba-
blya lower bound estimate of future stockownership over individuals' work-
lives for two reasons. First, these estimates are based on a cross-section of
households at only one point in time. Second, there has been a secular
upward trend in stockholding by households, one likely to continue. Not all
those cun-ently lacking stocks would necessadly benefit greatly from addi-
tional equity exposure. For example, very risk-averse workers who face a
small fixed cost of market entry might benefit a bit but not very much from
putting some equities in their individual social security accounts. Further-
more, some people would not benefit at all from holding stocks - for exam-
ple, those whose payor business income is sufficiently highly correlated with
the equity market.
A back-of-the-envelope guess about the magnitude of these effect might
go as follows. Consider a fully constrained household with no wealth outside
social secudty. This household should regard the first $100 of stock in its
individual social security account as almost dskless, and therefore attach a
present value to it of $385 as calculated earlier. The substitution of $100 of
stock for $100 of bonds thus increases net present value by $285. Additional
increments of stock, however, lead to more substantial dsk for this house-
hold. Suppose, for example, that 2 percent of payroll, or one-sixth of all
social security contributions, were allowed to be put into stock through
individual accounts. Ifwe presumed that the optimal (unconstrained) port-
folio consisted of half stocks and half bonds, this would move the con-
strained household one-third of the way toward this optimum. Using a lin-
ear interpolation,79 this lowers the average gain to investing in stock, from
$285 to (5/6) (285) = $237 for this constrained investor. so Assuming that
about half of the population is constrained, and that only half of these
are substantially constrained, an investment of2 percent of payroll from so-
cial security contributions into equities in private accounts would there-
fore bring a present value gain in the aggregate of approximately $59
(= 0/2) X (1/2) ($237» foreach$IOOin stock.S ) This figure is far smaller
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than the gain of $285 attributed by a non-risk-adjusted calculation, but
sufficiendy larger than zero to justify further investigation.
A related consideration is that allowing additional equities to be held in
household portfolios would likely increase the demand for, and hence lower
the return on, stocks.82 This would moderate the benefits to constrained
households, who in the main are likely to be younger workers, and would
actually hurt young unconstrained workers who have not yet accumulated
stocks. (Conversely, older and wealthier people who held stock prior to the
change would tend to benefit by the increased demand for stock.)8' It is
interesting to note that the potential for this cross-generational wealth
transfer-away from today's young-has been overlooked by those who
would argue that the young would be most likely to experience higher
returns from individual accounts.
When evaluating individual accounts, it is essential to recognize still other
types of risk in addition to the stock market risk that has been our focus thus
far. Recall that participants' exposure to risk in earnings, health, length of
life, and inflation would rise under an individual account plan as compared
to the current defined benefit plan. If private financial markets cannot
provide all the benefits that the national old-age program offers, or provides
them less efficiently, this raises the risk-adjusted return on the govern-
ment run plan relative to an individual account plan, but is not reflected in
standard non-risk-adjusted money's worth estimates. On the other hand,
publicly-run, underfunded programs are subject to political risk, which
many believe is greater than in an individual account model. Current work-
ers in a pay-as-you-go system are unsure that future (born and unborn)
generations will support them when they are old; they well know that benefit
and tax payments vary according to political pressures. Since there is no
market that can be used to protect against such risk, those potentially more
able to bear the risk cannot trade with those less willing to bear it. Cor-
recting for political risk would very likely increase the money's worth of a
funded, individual account plan.
In summary, money's worth measures should not be compared across
plans containing different levels offunding and portfolio compositions un-
less transition costs are incorporated and appropriate risk adjustmen ts are
carried out. Once these adjustments are undertaken, some people would
benefit from individual accounts, others would see no change in their
money's worth, and yet others would see declines. On balance, risk-adjusted
money's worth would be significantly less favorable toward individual ac-
counts than the typical analysis implies.
Moneys Worth of Investing the Trust Fund in EqUities
Some analysts find it attractive for social security to move toward equity
investments, but believe that diversification into stocks is better achieved
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through central trust fund investment rather than individual accounts.
Thus Munnell and Balduzzi (1998: 5) contend that "investing in equities
could provide a lot of additional money to the trust fund," a logic that
explains why architects of the Maintain Benefits plan for the Advisory Coun-
cil proposed to devote 40 percent of the trust fund to equities. Since the
Advisory Council did not risk-adjust its money's worth measures, this change
in trust fund investments substantially boosts the money's worth value of the
MB plan, as compared to a reform that was otherwise similar but invested
only in bonds.54
For the population at large, it should be obvious that shifting the trust
fund into equities will have some of the same effects that we saw when
discussing the shifting of individual accounts into equities."' The exact ef-
fects depend on who bears the risk of the trust fund investments. If the risks
are passed on directly to the beneficiaries, and households understand this,
then unconstrained investors would offset changes in the social security
account by altering their private portfolios, as we saw above. For these house-
holds, there would be no net change in the correctly calculated money's
worth of an ME-type plan from investing the trust fund in equities, once the
additional risk ofholding equities is taken into account. Constrained house-
holds as well as financially unsophisticated or irrational households (Ad-
visory Council 1997: 114) might be better off if the social security program
undertook stock investments on their behalf. But some would be worse off,
including those who optimally chose to hold only a small amount of stocks
before the change, perhaps because they are risk averse. These people might
be forced to hold too much equity in their social security account after the
trust fund bought stocks. In general, the more heterogeneous are con-
strained households in their risk tolerance, and the wiser we think con-
strained households would be in their investment choices, the more aUrac-
tive is privatization relative to trust fund investment as a means of achieving
diversification. The more homogeneous are constrained households in
their tolerance of risk, and the more myopic we think constrained house-
holds would be in their investment choices, the more attractive is trust fund
investment as a means ofachieving diversification.
An alternative approach to risk bearing would be to have all stock market
risk borne by future taxpayers through tax rate changes. llfi As described
earlier, this could improve intergenerational risk sharing as compared to
the status quo. Estimating the value of this potential intergenerational risk
pooling is a research question of substantial theoretical and practical inter-
est, one left to future research.
Conclusion
The most popular argument in favor of social security privatization is that it
would increase rates of return for all retirees. We have shown that this
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argument is false. The U.S. social security system's unfunded liability stands
at around $10 trillion, based on the constant benefit/tax ratio method for
calculating accrued benefits. Privatizing the system would allow households
to earn market returns on their social security contributions. But if those
contributions were taXed just enough to keep the unfunded liability a con-
stant fraction of GDP, then in the absence of uncertainty, extra market
returns would be entirely dissipated. Future workers would not perceive any
higher net investment returns than they would under the current social
security system, because, for every dollar of social security contributions,
they would have to pay about 29 cents in tax to meet payments on the
unfunded liability inhedted from transfers to previous generations. If part
of the unfunded social security liability were paid down faster via new taxes,
or if the system's unfunded liability were reduced (for example by cutting
accrued benefits), then it would be possible for future generations to earn
more after privatization than they would from the current system. But these
gains will come at the expense of either today's workers or lOday's retirees.
Some policy analysts use money's worth calculations to endorse privatiza-
tion for the purposes of increasing workers' investments in equities. They
support their contention by reminding us that equity I'eturns have histor-
ically been higher than bond returns. But we show that extending money's
worth to a world of uncertainty is a difficult business. If four assumptions
pertaining to optimization, time homogeneity, stable prices, and spanning
hold, then market value gives the correct measure of an asset's money's
worth. Under these circumstances, the alleged supedority of equity returns
over bond returns is irrelevant, since one dollar of stocks is worth no more
than one dollar of bonds. This contrasts with computations offered by the
Advisory Council attributing a money's worth of about $3.85 per dollar of
stock, obtained by discounting expected stock returns of 7 percent using a
riskless rate 01'2.3 percent.
In the real world the four assumptions required for money's worth mea-
sures may not hold, with the spanning assumption especially likely to fail. In
its absence, market value will not provide an accurate measure of money's
worth. We estimate that if social security equity holdings reached 2 percent
of payroll, then each dollar of stock would yield about $1.59 of money's
worth rather than $3.85. Our analysis depends on the educated guess that
perhaps one-quarter of households are substantially constrained from hold-
ing stock. The failure of spanning also changes our assessment of current
social security benefit streams. That is, the market probably can duplicate
some but not all of the socially provided benefits (such as real annuities,
income insurance, and disability insurance). Once the value of the social
insurance benefits is taken into account, the money's worth advantage of
privatization becomes smaller than generally recognized by advocates.
There are other costs and benefits of social security reform that are diffi-
cult to incorporate into money's worth measures but which may neverthe-
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less exert an important influence in the growing debate. Under the current
system, no markets exist to protect against future benefit and tax changes
when people are most vulnerable during retirement. Under an individual
account format, by contrast, these political risks may be diminished, and
people may also have a greater sense of ownership and control over their in-
dividual accounts. It is also possible that privatization may make prefunding
more politically feasible. On the other hand along with these accounts may
come the danger of inexperienced investors making imprudent decisions.
In sum, money's worth measures are well suited to comparing benefits
and costs for different income groups, and even different cohorts, under
the same social security system. But the typical approaches do not fare well
at making compal-isons across different reform plans, primarily because
they do not properly account for differences in risk and/ or transition costs.
Developing money's worth measures that are capable of this task is more
difficult. Further efforts to adapt money's worth measures to incorporate
these elements will playa compelling role in the continuing debate over
social security restructuring.
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Notes
J. In a similar vein, Stephen Moore (1997) of the Cato Institute appeared before
Congress to "enumerate the economic advantages of converting out of our pay-as-
you-go government-run Social Security system to a program ofPSAs.... Privatization
offers a much higher financial rate of return to young workers than the current
system ... if Congress were to allow a 25 year old working woman today to invest her
payroll tax contributions in private capital markets, her retirement benefit would be
two to five times higher than what Social Security is offering."
2. So this first approach might compare returns under the current system for a
minimum-wage worker to that of a high-wage worker in the same cohort, or for a
single worker to those paid to a married couple. Or one might analyze how an earlier
cohort fared vis avis a cohan born at some later date using a money's worth measure.
3. As we discuss below, there are other reasonable rationales for supporting social
security privatization; see Mitchell and Zeldes (1996). For example, a privatized
individual account system may better protect benefits against political risk than the
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current (projected to be insolvent) system. In addition, an individual-account system
may induce fewer labor supply distortions than the current system if the individual-
account plan is less redistributive than the current program, and it is likely to provide
households with expanded options for portfolio choice. And compared to a
federally-run plan that invests the social security trust fund directly in the capital
market, an individual-account plan may be better insulated against politicians'
efforts to influence investment decisions.
4. This is somewhat lower than for the historical period between 1938 and 1973,
but not so different from actual growth rates since then.
5. Leimer (1996) also mentions the payback period and the net transfer as a
percentage of the present value of lifetime earnings in an excellent summary of
these and other money's worth measures.
6. The fourth column is the cumulative NPV (i.e., the running sum of column 3).
We will return to this later.
7. It would not make sense to calculate present values of infinite streams in a social
security program with 'T less than g. In such a case the calculations would be com-
pletely dominated by events in the distant future.
8. The conditions under which discounting is feasible ('T>g) are the same as those
for the dynamic efficiency of an economy. In a world with time-varying but non-
stochastic 'Tand g, the required condition is that a type of average of 'Tis greater than
average g. If rand g are stochastic, the analysis becomes significantly more compli-
cated. Abel et al. (1989) argue that the empirical evidence supports dynamic effi-
ciency, even in a stochastic world.
9. To the extent that the actual historical rate of growth was closer to the real
market rate of interest, our stylized numbers will exaggerate the importance of the
past. But we shall see when we look at actual numbers that our stylized numbers still
convey appropriate magnitudes.
10. For very early cohorts, the lRR is infinite in this model because these people
received benefits but paid no taxes. In the actual U.S. system, only those who had
made some contributions received any benefits.
11. To see this, note that each column of taxes and benefits must sum to zero by
definition in a pay-as-youiSo system. The column under 1997, for example, sums to
zero because taxes raised in that year are exactly equal to benefits paid in our
hypothetical pay-as-youiSo system. But these same 1997 numbers turn out also to
equal the present value, in 1997 dollars but figured at a rate of return g, of the
benefits and taxes of the generation born in 1918. Hence the rate of return on the
taxes paid by the 1918 cohort is g, as claimed. By the homogeneity property of rates
of return, the rate of return of every other cohort born after 1918 must also be g.
12. This follows from the commutative law of addition for absolutely convergent
series. Note that for any finite set ofentries, such as those shown in Table 1, we do not
expect the cumulative sum of the row NPVs to be zero just because the correspond-
ing cumulative NPV of the column sums is zero. The first t rows cover a very different
set of entries from the first t columns. It is only when we consider the infinite sum
that all the columns cover exactly the same set of entries as all the rows.
13. Thus extra consumption by the Depression-era generations must be paid for by
an infinity of reduced consumption when added over all future generations. One
might well ask whether a social planner ought to weight the importance of the
Depression-era generation so heavily that this would be seen as a fair exchange: that
is, when should one discount the welfare of future generations at the market rate of
(real) interest? The answer to this question is moot, of course, since the decision was
made by the socia; security system's architects in the 1930s. But a similar question may
be formulated going forward, namely, how much do furnre generations owe the gen-
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eration that kept the nation together during the Depression, fought and won World
War II, and built the markets that enabled future generations to be so productive?
14. Indeed we show below that one natural way of spreading the debt burden is to
tax each generation in the same proportion k( r - g) of its income. As long as T - g is
the same, higher g does not reduce the proportional burden of the debt overhang
from the Depression-era generations.
15. The concept ofunfunded liability is different from that ofactuarial imbalance.
Actuarial imbalance is defined as the present value of expected benefits over some
period (often 75 years) minus the present value of expected tax receipts over the
same period, minus the current value of the trust fund. The U.S. currently has a 75-
year actuarial imbalance of about 2.2 percent of payroll per year, or about $2.9
trillion dollars in present value (Goss, this volume).
16. This surplus is equal to zero in our stylized pure PAYGO system.
17. Since the accumulated trust fund in our setup is zero, the sum of the entries in
the fourth column equals the unfunded liability, $9.1 trillion.
18. For a longer discussion of these distinctions see Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and
Zeldes (forthcoming).
19. See also Leimer's (1991) analysis of this topic.
20. In a steady state, this would correspond to keeping constant the ratio of out-
standing recognition bond debt to GOP.
21. There are different ways of measuring accrued benefits, and each method
would require a different tax scheme to make taxes in a privatized system just equal
to transfers in the current social security system. We give one example. Suppose
accrued benefits are defined according to the present benefit! cost ratio method.
Then a proportional tax of (1 - .71) X 12.4 percent = 3.6 percent would leave
everyone exactly as well off in a privatized system as he would have been in the
current pay-as-you-go social security system. For the straight line method, taxes
would need to be cohort-specific. In particular, taxes could be reduced for current
workers and kept at 29 percent for future workers.
22. This simple example is not too dissimilar in spirit from what Chile did in 1981
as it privatized a major portion of its old-age retirement program (Mitchell and
Barreto 1997).
23. Observe that the ratio of new transition taxes T1 (l+g)t-l(T-g)/(I+l·) to
income Y1 (I +g) ,-I for each generation depends on the difference r - g, not on the
magnitude of g, for small values of rand g.
24. A higher T makes privatized returns higher but, as we have just seen, it also
increases the interest burden of the unfunded liability.
25. By the same argument, if transition costs are ignored, the other money's worth
measure comparisons are also biased in favor of privatizing social security.
26. This presumes that improved funding of social security has a sufficiently small
effect on the government budget deficit. For a discussion of this point see the
discussion in Technical Panel on Trends and Issues in Retirement Income (1997).
There is no reason to believe that privatization without prefunding would necessarily
increase national saving (see for instance Mitchell and Zeldes 1996).
27. This point is acknowledged by some analysts (e.g., Feldstein 1997, 1998b)
though most popular accounts of privatization overlook the point, as we have noted
above.
28. Examples of previous studies focusing on the tax and benefit flows under social
security include Baskin and Puffert (1987), Boskin et al. (1987), Caldwell et al.
(1998), Duggan et al. (1993), Hurd and Shoven (1985), Leimer (1994), Moffitt
(1984), Myers (1996), Myers and Schoebel (1992), Panis and Lillard (1985), and
SteurJe and Bakija (1994).
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29. As explained below, the fact that the current social security system faces insol-
vency implies that is it not a viable benchmark. In other words, alternative reforms
must be compared to benchmarks that have incorporated changes sufficient to make
the overall system solvent.
30. One reason the representative worker (or set of workers) is used for Social
Security Administration money's worth computations is that year-by-year payroll tax
data on individuals are not available for years prior to 1951. The Social Security
Administration is able to compute benefils because it keeps data on the sum of the
wages on which taxes were paid, which is all that is required to construct benefit
amounts (Myers 1993: App. 2-5). While exact data are not available for these very
early birth cohorts, approximations could be made based on the data that are
available.
31. Hypothetical workers' money's worth calculations have also been undertaken
by many researchers, most recently Caldwell et al. (1998).
32. If these benefits are not included, the full tax rate should not be included
either.
33. Personal communication, Office of the Actuary, SSA, August 1997.
34. See Miron and Weil (1998) for a historical comparison of ex-ante and ex-post
tax and benefit rules.
35. Because these calculations follow all those alive at around the time of labor
market entry and take into account mortality probabilities, they naturally differ from
a computation that compares benefits received versus taxes paid by those surviving
to age 65 (e.g., Thompson 1983).
36. Forecasts offuture mortality are developed by age and sex, and show a continu-
ing gradual improvement in life expectancy over time. For a full discussion of social
security program benefit formulas and eligibility requirements see Myers (1993) and
Board ofTrustees (1998) or see www.ssa.govon the internet.
37. For the future, the forecasted real rate is equal to 4.3 percent in 1997, falling to
3.4 percent by 2000, and to 2.3 percent by 2010 where it is assumed to hold (Board of
Trustees 1996: 56-57).
38. As we note below, there is no particular reason to use the historical rate of
return on trust fund assets to discount benefit and taxes since the social security
system is essentially unfunded (trust fund assets at the end of 1997 equaled approx-
imately 175 percent of one year's benefit outlays). The riskiness of tax and benefit
flows are, in principle, not related to the riskiness of trust fund assets.
39. For IRR and PVT/ PVB, the choice of units is irrelevant.
40. This is based on the intermediate cost assumptions in the Trustees Report
(Board ofTrustees, various years). These p"esem values are typically calculated using
a 75-year horizon as described in Goss (this volume).
41. For the Advisory Council (1997) estimates, the Holdben plan raises payroll
taxes to keep the OASDI trust fund ratio from falling below 100 percent. The Hold-
tax plan cuts benefits as needed so payroll taxes need not be raised.
42. Leimer's estimates were derived based on data as of 1991. We are hopeful that
in the future additional microeconomic data will become available from the Social
Security Administration to update the Leimer computations, but these are not avail-
able as of this writing.
43. The underlying IRR, NPV, and PVB/PVT estimates were kindly supplied to us
in 1997 by the SSA Office of the Chief AClUary for a range of birth cohorts and
workers of several stylized types. To create the weights for the composite worker we
used Table W, p. 205 (Advisory Council 1997). The IRR composite worker figures
represent weighted averages of the underlying worker types, rather than being the
IRR for a composite worker.
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44. The graph only includes data going back to the 1920 birth cohort, because
data for earlier cohorLs were not available to us.
45. See Chapter 1 for a more complete description of the Advisory Council plans.
46. These IRR "crossovers" illustrate the key point that one birth cohort will
perceive its money's worth differently from another cohort's, depending on how it is
likely to fare under tlle plan.
47. The conditions that must be met in order to compare different social security
regimes can be significantly weakened when comparing welfare of different people
or sets of people (say, different income classes) under the smneregime. For example,
it may be reasonable to support that, though all people are myopic, they are all
similarly myopic; it may be acceptable tn suppose that all individuals in the economy
face the same prices (though across different social security regimes, prices can
change), and so on.
48. See, e.g., Kotlikolf (1989) and Tobin (1996). One reason the young might
undersave is myopia: they fail to loresee their eventual discomfort when old. Ex-post,
each cohort will realize that it should have saved more and consumed less when it was
young. Another reason the young (or some subset of the young) might undersave is
that they might act strategically, in that they count on the sympathy of their children
or the government to support them in old age (the "Samaritan's dilemma"; cf
O'Connell and Zeldes 1993).
49. In the presence of borrowing constraints and no myopia, money's worth is
biased in the opposite way: workers would be made worse off by a larger plan than a
smaller plan (or no plan), even if the plans all paid market rates of return and had
identical money's worth measures.
50. There is a fine line between redistribution and insurance (discussed below);
what differentiates the two is the information set that we condition on. From the per-
spective of someone with no information about lifetime wages and mortality pros-
pects other than population averages, transfers from high-earners to low-earners can
be seen as insurance. Ex-post, however, households have more information about
lifetime earnings profiles as well as life expectancy. In the light of this additional
information, social security transfers are seen as redistribution.
51. Precisely which measure of aggregate consumption, and how big the penalty
should be per unit of covariance, does depend on the particular prices of the mar-
keted securities. So the arbitrage pricing theorem does not really free us from check-
ing all the marketed securities. But it clarifies precisely how the non-risk-adjusted
approach might go wrong.
52. The Advisory Council (1997) assumed a future mean real return on stocks of7
percent, lower than the historical arithmetic average.
53. For related evidence see Siegel (1997).
54. We can capture the phenomenon of "irrational risk aversion" while maintain-
ing our hypothesis of optimization by supposing that, in addition to the utility they
get from the financial payoffs of the stock, households also get disutility from hold-
ing these securities (for concreteness, .say they lose E X 5', where S is equal to the
dollar value of shares held). In equilibrium, stocks will necessarily have a higher
return in order to get people to hold them and be compensated for the disutility.
55. It is not clear how best to compare NPVs across cohorts. The Advisory Council
report (1997) selected an aggregate earnings index to convert NPV estimates into a
common year's dollars; this is only one of many alternative choices.
56. "Small" means that the payoffs to the individual from the portion of his social
security benefits that depend on stock returns are small relative to his consumption
in those periods when he is receiving benefits.
57. A rate higher than the risk-free rate, but lower than the return on equity,
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should also be used for households who already have 100 percent of their financial
assets in the stock market and would like more.
58. We recognize that even in a mandatory national social security program, peo-
ple can and do evade taxes for at least part of their work lives (Manchester, this vol-
ume). To the extent that such evasion is possible, it may produce adverse selection-
for example, by people expecting not to live very long. This will undermine a national
program's ability to pool retirement system risk across the population.
59. Consider the analogy to homeowners' fire insurance. Suppose no private mar-
ket for fire insurance existed, and the government introduced this insurance at
actuarially fair rates. If there were no administrative costs, the NPV of this insurance,
based on discounting expected cash flows at a risk-free rate, would equal zero. Yet ex-
ante households would clearly be better offwith the insurance, as it reduces the risks
faced by households.
60. Households would be worse off in an ex-ante sense, prior to any private infor-
mation being revealed.
61. If individuals waited un til retiremen t age to purchase annuities (as is curren tly
generally the case), the private markets are likely to be plagued by substantialiy more
adverse selection than ifindiviudals annuitize at earlier ages. For an empirical assess-
ment of the adverse selection and administrative costs on private annuities, see
Mitchell et al. (1999). Even if no adverse selection were present, if the government
could provide annuities with lower administrative cost, current money's wonh esti-
mates would underestimate the value of the current system relative to a privatized
one. The reserve would be true if the private sector costs were greater than that of
the government. A similar argument holds for disability insurance coverage.
62. Some intergenerational insurance would remain in both the 1A and PSA pro-
posa)s developed by the Advisory Council (1997) since both include a mandatory
minimum defined-benefit guarantee financed by pay-as-you-go taxes.
63. Constrained households would be better off under this approach because
under the previous plan they would effectively be forced into a short position in the
stock market.
64. There is no particular reason that the government should undertake this risk-
sharing through social security. In fact, the argument above assumes that no other
tax and transfer scheme is accomplishing the same risk sharing.
65. For recent surveys of the literature on how social security has influenced
retirement in the United States over time, see Diamond and Gruber (1997) and
Lumsdaine and Mitchell (forthcoming).
66. We also recall that these distortions go hand in hand with increased insurance
(Diamond 1977).
67. Tanner's testimony to the Social Security Advisory Council (March 5, 1995) is
reported on the internet at www.socialsecurity.org/testimony/. A number of World
Wide Web sites now provide taxpayers with the opportunity to compare their own
rates of return under a system of privatized accounts to those under the current
social security system; see for example www.socialsecurity.org. Some of these sites
provide money's worth results using the rate of return, while others provide antici-
pated levels of retirement income under alternate scenarios.
68. As described earlier, Goss (this volume) uses a method close to the straight-line
method to estimate the U.S. unfunded liability to be $8.9 trillion, close to the $9.1
trillion in our stylized model using the straight-line method. We have no estimates of
the U.S. unfunded liability computed according to the constant PVB/PVT method
described in the first section, but it seems reasonable to assume that it would be close
to the $9.9 trillion estimate from our stylized model using the PVB/PVT method.
69. Subsequent payments would rise at 1.2 percent per year.
70. OASDI taxes inflows in 1997 were actually closer to $415 billion, or about $45
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billion more than benefits, because the current baby boom demographics have given
rise to a temporary surplus.
71. Had we used the straight line method for computing accrued benefits, giving
an unfunded liability of $9 trillion, and had we used actual OASDI contributions of
$400 billion, then we would have obtained a ratio of new taxes to payroll contribu-
tions of about ($99 billion) / ($400 billion) = 25 percent, as given in our earlier
paper (Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 1998).
72. See the Advisory Council report (1997) and Chapter 1 (this volume) for more
discussion of the specifics of the PSA plan.
73. For a description of the Social Security Solvency Act of 1998 (S. 1792) see the
internet site at www.senate.gov/-moynihan.
74. This perspective is summarized in Technical Panel on Trends in Income and
Retirement Saving (1997).
75. A different approach might be to establish individual accounts from some
other source, for example by using funds from a federal budget surplus. Thus Presi-
dent Bill Clinton recently suggested that Congress preserve the anticipated budget
surplus for social security; see Wall StreetJournal (1998). This would reduce both the
actuarial imbalance and the unfunded liability of the current system, and hence
would genuinely increase the rate of return to social security. Of course, such a plan
is not costless, since one must take into account what those funds would have paid for
in the absence of social security reform (e.g., a tax cut or a spending increase).
76. This argument applies even if, as some would argue, there is an inexplicably
large equity premium, as we saw above.
77. As we will see, the same argument applies to the money's worth estimates of
trust fund investment in equities.
78. In these figures the money's worth for the IA and PSA plans is everywhere
above that for the Holdtax plan, though in principle one might expect them to be
coincident or else cross; further research into this question continues.
79. This linear interpolation would be exact in the case of quadratic utility.
80. We arrive at this as follows. lIthe household were able to achieve a 50-50 split,
the last $100 switched to equity would be worth zero. The 2 percent of payroll
contribution (=1/6 of wealth) into stocks moves the investor one-third of the way
toward the optimum, so the last $100 of this nets him $190 (=2/3 X $285 + 1/3 X
$0). Therefore the average gain for this constrained household is approximately the
average of these marginal gains, ($285+$190) /2 = $237.
81. This net present value gain of$59 would correspond to a risk-adjusted internal
rate of return of 3.9 percent over 30 years on a full investment into stock, versus the
2.3 percent for an unconstrained investor, and the 7 percent for the first $100 of a
totally constrained investor.
82. For a discussion of possible general equilibrium effects of increased demand
for equities due to holding social security assets in equities see White (1996) and
Munnell and Balduzzi (1998).
83. Additional stock in the hands of constrained households means less stock and
less risk in the hands of unconstrained households. The effect is likely to be that
unconstrained households will likely finance investment projects that are more risky.
84. The effect of this MB investment strategy on money's worth measures-versus
holding only bonds in the trust fund - is not provided in the Advisory Council
report. Nevertheless, one may compare the additional revenue gleaned from moving
from a trust fund consisting of 40 percent stocks under the MB plan, to one where
the trust fund held half of its portfolio in equities. This alternative, dubbed the MB+
plan by the Advisory Council, has PVB/ PVT ratios that are equal to or surpass those
of the PSA plan for all cohorts analyzed by as much as 5-7 percent (Advisory Council
1997: 218). On the other hand, money's worth for the MB+ trajectory is not pre-
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cisely comparable to that for MB plan, since other plan features are not held con-
stant; that is, the MB+ plan also raises taxes and borrowing as does the PSA plan, and
benefits are boosted as revenue rises.
85. One caveat is that money managemen t costs would likely be somewhat lower if
the funds were centrally managed, instead of held in individual accounts (Mitchell
1998). On the other hand, indh~dual accounts would afford the advantages of ad-
ditional investment choice and probably additional service not provided by the
government-run system.
86. In practice it seems unlikely that benefits would be left unchanged in response
to a large market drop. There are numerous instances when benefits have been
reduced under both private and public defined benefit pensions, including the cut
in social security benefits due to the cost-<Jf-living delay in 1983 (for a discussion of
this change see Myers 1993).
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